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INTRODUCTION
The significance of the philosophy of David Hume is two-fold.
his work marks

~~e

First,

end of an important cycle in the history of philosophy.

Gilson has rightly termed this period as "the Cartesian cycle." 1
thought also had a great influence upon Immanuel Kant.
confesses that it was David Hume who aroused

hL~

Hume's

In fact Kant

from his dogmatic slumber,

and started him in a new direction in his philosophic thought.

2

Kant, we

know, was confronted with the problem of the relationship of the phenomenal
to the noumenal world.

David Hume likewise faced the problem of the externa

world. What is the relationship between thought and things, and between
the individual and the external world?
This study will consider and evaluate Hume's solution to this problem,
based principally on Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, as well as his
Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding•

1
2

Particularly

Etienne Gilson, The Unity ~ Philosophical Experience.
Sons, Kew York, 1937, 219.

L~portant

Charles

in this

Scrib~s

Irmnanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysi2_• transle.ted by H.P.
Mahaffy and J.H. Bernard, Macmillan Co., Few York, 1889. In the
Introduction Kant says: "I honestly confess the suggestion of David
Hume •••• first interrupted my dogmatic slumber, end gave my investigation
in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction."

1

2

study are the following parts of the Treatise:
Book

Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason

r, rv, 1.

Book I, IV, 2.

Of Scepticism with Regard to the s-enses

Book I, rv,4.

Of MOdern Philosophy

Book I,IV,5.

Of the Immateriality of the Soul

Hume also briefly treats of this subject in his Inquiry Concerning ~
Human Understandin~, in Section XII,I, entitled, Or the Academic or Sceptical
Philosophy.

The treatment of this study is as follows:

CHAPTER I

AN ACCOUNT OF flUME'S POSITION

An account of Hume's position, which determines

his conclusion concerning the external world, by
showing his purpose, first principle, procedure,
and the fundamentals of his theory of knowledge
appropriate to our problem.

CHAPTER II

AN ANALYSIS OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Hume's analysis of the origin of our belief
in the external world, which is not from

t~e

senses, nor from reason, but from the tmagination.

CHAPTER III

THE REASONS FROM HUME t 8 POSIT ION

A consideration of Hume's theory of knowledge in its relationship to Locke and Berkeley,

and the consequent originality in the problem
of the external world.

' CHAPTER IV

AN EVALUATION OF HUME'S POSITION

A two part critical estimate of flume's
problem and its solution; the principle of
immanence creates a pseudo-problem; flume's
procedure involves inadequacies and inconsistencies.

CH.API'ER I

AN ACCOUNT OF HDME'S POSITION
Let us consider, first, the purpose of Hume's philosophy.
it for us in the Introduction to his Treatise.

He states

He is certain that all the

sciences are related in a greater or lesser degree to human nature, and
that no matter how far they may seem to be from human nature, they must
still return by one passage or another.

1

Thus, Hume continues,

~~thematics,

Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion are in some degree, at least,
dependent upon man.

If this be true of these sciences, how much more is it

true of the other sciences so intimately related to man, such as Logic,
Morals, Criticis.m and Politics.

He therefore feels that the only hope for

success in our philosophical researches, is to leave behind what Hume terms
in the Introduction, "the tedious lingering method," which has been followed
in the past, and instead of taking one castle or village or frontier, it
is now in order to march right to the center and capital of all these
sciences, to human nature itself, which if once mastered, it is hoped, will
1 ea d everyone e 1 se t o easy

. t ory. 2

v~c

Starting from this anthropocentric position, Hume maintains that the
only foundation for the study of man is experience and observation. 3

1 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. 2 vols., edited by T.H. Greene
and T.H. Grose., Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1882, Introduction.
2

Ibid.

3

Ibid.

4

5

Just as the only foundation for all the sciences is the solid foundation
of the science of

man~

so likewise the only solid foundation for the science

of man is and must be in experience and observation.

By experience Hume

means what he himself terms as "experimental philosophy," which he illustrates thus:
When I am at a loss to know the effects of one
body upon another in any situation, I need only put
them in that situation, and observe what results from
it.4
This experimental method becomes then, one of the important factors
in his whole philosophy, and is the key to his whole position.

A summa~J

of the implications of this statement as well as the position itself is
well expressed by N.K. Smith:
Experiment is, Hume teaches us, the final court
of appeal in respect to all matters of fact. But it
can supply only particulars, and even these only in
diffe5ent circumstances and situations appropriate to
them.
Hume further holds that the essence of both mind and external bodies
is unknown.

His own words are the best evidence of his thought:
For to me it seems evident, that the essence of the
mind being equally unknown to us with that of
external bodies, it must be equally impossible
to form any notion of its powers and qualities
6
otherwise than from careful and exact experiments.

4

Ibid.

5

Norman Kemp Smith, ~Philosophy 2,! David~.. ! Critical Study
Origins and Central Doctrines, ~~cmillan Co., London, 1941, 61.

6

Hume, Introduction.

of~

6
If the mind by experiments can only know particulars, as Hume has

already indicated, it is certain it can never know essences.
Hume to two further significant statements:

This leads

(1) Ultimate and universal

principles are impossible, and (2) any hypothesis pretending to discover
ultimate qualities of human nature ought at first to be rejected as pre7
sumptuous and chimerical.
From this account of his purpose we turn directly to his first prinoiple, which is the basis of his whole philosophy.
The first principles of Hume's whole philosophic structure is that "no
beings are ever present ~o the mind but perceptions." 8

Furthermore these

perceptions are the only existences of which we are certain, which being immediately present to our consciousness, command our strongest agreenent and
thus are the first foundation of all of our conclusions. 9
Hume includes in the term perception, .all the actions of sight, hearing,
judging, loving and hating, as well as thinking.

In the opening statement

of his Treatise, he states that all that enters the mind in any for.m is a
perception.
All the perceptions of the human mind resolve
themselves into two kinds, which I call impressions
and ideas. 10

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid., I,IV,2.

9

Ibid.

10

Ibid. Introduction.

,....

..

7

Concerning this opening statement in the Treatise, Hendel in his
Studies in the Philosophy of Hume states that in the opening part of the
Treatise there is contained new terminology and distinctions, so that all
that exists as far as the mind is concerned are these perceptions. 11
The question arises, how does Hume develop this first principle?

This

is our next consideration, the procedure in the development of Hurne's
philosophf, which includes the description of both impressions and ideas,
the distinction between them, as well as a description of the mind.
First, Hume presents his definition of both impressions and ideas.
By impressions he understands all of our sensations, passions, and emotions,
as they enter the soul.

These enter the soul with most force and violence.

Hume describes them thus:
Those perceptions which enter with most force
and violence, we may n~e impressions; and under this
n~e, I comprehend all our sensations, paasions and
emoti~Rs, as they make their first appearance in the
soul.
He defines and describes ideas as follows:
By ideas, I mean the faint images of these in
thinking and reasoning; such as for instance, are
all the perceptions excited by the present discourse,
exceptfgg only those which arise £rom the sight and
touch.
He does not believe it further necessary to use words in the explanation
of the difference between impressions and ideas.

He feels that everyone

11

Charles W. Hendel, Studies in~ Philosophy~ David Hume, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1925, 112.

12

Hume, I,I,l.

13

Ibid.

8

will personally readily perceive the difference between feeling and thinking.
The ordinary degrees of these are easily distinguished; although Hume admits
it is not impossible in particular instances that they may easily and nearly
approach each other.
He points out, for

ex~ple,

how in sleep, or in fever, or in madness.

or in any other violent emotion of the soul, our ideas may approach our
impressions, or, onthe other hand, it sometimes happens that our impressions
are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. 14
Hume still further divides impressions and ideas into simple and complex
By simple perceptions, that is impressions and ideas, he means such which
allow of no distinction or separation, while the complex are contrary to the
simple, and may be distinguished into parts.
mind.

Hume illustrates what he has in

In an apple, a particular color, taste, and smell are qualities united

together in the apple, "though it is easy to perceive they are not the same,
but are at least distinguishable from each other."l 5
However, to understand more clearly Hume's analysis, it is necessary to
consider the division of the impressions.

These impressions may be divided

into two kinds, impressions of sensation, and those of reflection.

]npres-

sions of sensation arise in the soul, from causes unknown, while impressions
from reflection are derived at least in a great measure, from our ideas, in
the following way.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid.

9
An impression strikes first upon the senses, and makes us perceive

either heat or cold, hunger or thirst, pleasure or pain.

Or this impression

the mind makes a copy, which still remains after the impression has already
ceased, and this we call an idea.

This idea, if for example, it be pleasure

or pain, when it has returned to the soul, again produces new impressions of
desire and aversion, hope and fear.

These new impressions may properly be

called impressions of reflection, because they are derived from it.

lle

concludes this analysis by describing impressions of reflection as passions,
desires, and emotions arising mostly from ideas. 16
llume further explains his division of impressions by describing the
three kinds of sense impressions.
First, there are sense impressions of figure, bulk, motion and solidity
of bodies.
and cold.

Also there are those of color, taste, smells and sounds, heat
While the third kind of sense

L~pressions

includes pains end

pleasures that arise from the application of objects to our bodies, such as
the cutting of flesh with steel and the like. 17

As all ideas are copies of previous impressions, and since these
impressions are perceptions of the mind, and no beings are ever present to t
mind but these perceptions, which are the only existences of which we are
certain, we ask the question, what is the mind in which these perceptions
appear, and how does it operate?

This leads to our last consideration in

Hume's procedure, his definition and description of the mind.
the mind in the following manner:

16

~.,

I,I,2.

He describes

10

What we call a mind is nothing but a heap or
collection of different perceptions, united together
by certain relations, and supposed though falsely,
18
to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.

In another later passage Hum.e describes the operation of the mind.

He

likens the mind to a kind of theater, where several perceptions appear,
pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and
sensations. However, he warns us that the comparison of the theater must
not mislead us.

For the successive perceptions alone are what constitutes

the mind, nor do we have the most distant notion of the place where the
senses are represented, nor the materials of which they are composed.

19

Thus flume begins with the purpose of building a philosophy upon the
science of human nature.

The basis of his new philosophy must be the

structure of experience and observation.

However, it must be remembered,

that observation means and includes the experimental method, which deals
only with particula.rs.

Hence essences remain unknown and the possibility

of any ultimates or universals must be ruled out at the very beginning.
This involved inHume's first principle, that no beings are ever present to
the mind but only perceptions.
These perceptions are all so many impressions e.nd ideas.

The impres-

sions include sensations, passions, and emotions as they first enter the
soul.

They enter

'~ith

most force and violence."

However, impressions

appear again as faint images, which Hume calls ideas.

18

Ibid.

19

~.,

I,IV,6.

He distinguishes

11

between impressions of sensation, which arise in the soul from causes unlalown, and impressions of reflection which arc derived in a great measure
from our ideas.

And the mind is nothing but a heap or collection of these

perceptions.
Having thus considered the purpose of Hume's philosophy, his first
principle, and the procedure in the development of his thought, let us
consider now those main tenets which clearly show how he deals with the
problem of the external world.

These four major doctrines include his anal-

ysis of reason, the importance of belief, the meaning of knowledge, and the
place of the

L~agination.

First, we consider Hume's analysis of reason.
Hume holds reason to be only the slave of the passions.
Reason is, and ought only to be, the sla.ve of
the passions, and can never pre~end to any other office
than to serve and to obey them. 0
This is indeed an innovation in Hume's thought; in fact, he shows in
the context of this passage that it is customary in philosophy to speak of
the strife between passion and reason, and the pre-eminence of reason.

The

greater part of ancient and modern philosophy is founded on the "supposed
pre-eminence of reason." 21

This subordination of reason to the passions is

central in Hume's philosophy and runs throughout his whole thought. 22

--------------------20

~·~

21

Ibid.

22

Smith., 154.

II,III,3.

That

~ ------------------------------------------------------------~
12
Hume was no doubt greatly inrluenced in his view by Hutcheson has been well
expressed by Smith. 23
There are two kinds of reason, according to Hume:
All reasonings may be divided into two. kinds, na~ely
demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations or
ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matters
or ract and existence.24
Demonstrative reason considers the comparison of ideas, as round in
mathematics, while moral reasoning "is connected with Rume's view
k~owledge

or

our

as determined by natural belier, and possessing no absolute

metaphysical truth."

25

Hume also holds that it is impossible to defend either reason or the
senses.
It is impossible, upon my system, to derend either
understanding or senses; and we but expose them further
when we endeavor to justiry them in that manner.26
Likewise he maintains that reason and the senses are in opposition to
each other.

23

Ibid., Here Smith shows that the main inrluenoe of Hutcheson upon Hume
was in the inversion or the roles ordinarily ascribed to passion and to
reason respectively. Passion is the term used by Hutcheson, as it is by
Hume, to cover all types or feelings, not only reeling in the strict
sense, (i.e. pleasure and pain) but also the instinctive bodily appetites
the emotions and sentiments, and in addition all the various types of
appreciation which find expression in values of judgments ••• Accordingly
Hutcheson's teaching appears in a new and revolutionary light in Hume,
when he rerormulates it in his fundamental maxim, reason is the slave of
the pass ions.

24

Hume,

~

Inquiry Concerning ~ Human Understanding ~ An Inquirz
Principles ~ N~rals. Introduction by Selby-Biggs, M.A.
Glarendon Press, Oxford, 1894, I, 4.
Concerning~

25
_26

Smith, 99.
HuntEb

Treatise, I., IV, 2.

~··

~------------------------------------------------------------

13
There is a direct and total opposition betwixt
our reason and our senses, or more properly speaking,
betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect,
and those that persuade us of continued and independent
existence of body.27
Finally, the reason is limited in that it cannot give the lowest
degree of evidence in support of any proposition, either in philosophy or
•

.

ord2nary l2fe.

28

To further illustrate this point he cites the example of

the Cynics, as
An extraordinary instance of philosophers, who,
from reasonings purely philosophical, ran into great
extravagances of conduct.29
The second main doctrine of Hume is that of belief.

First, we have

Eume's own definitions of belief.
A belief may be most accurately defined as a
lively idea related or associated with a present
impression.3°
In the very next section Hume defines belief to be "nothing but a

strong and lively idea, derived from a present L~pression related to it."

31

In both of the above definitions belief is a lively and strong idea.
However, in the first of these definitions is shown the relationship of the

27

~··

28

~., I,

29

Ibid.

30

~··

I, IV,4.

IV,-7.

I, III, 7.

:n Ibid., I,III,8.

14
idea. of belief to an impression, ·as shown in the expression, "associated
-with", whereas in the second definition, is shown the origin of the idea, as
being "derived from a present impression."
Belief is further described as an act of the mind arising from custom.32
Hume also holds to two natural beliefs.

First, .that objects have a

continuing, independent existence, and second, that these bodies are
operative one upon another.
We may well ask, what causes induce us to believe
in the existence of body? But it is vain to ask, whether
there be body or not? That is a point taken for granted
in all our reasonings.33
He defends this view by showing that nature does not leave this to our
choice, since it is of too great importance, "to be trusted to our uncertain
reasonings and speculations." 34
The operation of belief is described by Hume when he concludes
That belief consists merely in a certain feeling
or sentiment; in something that depends not on the will,
but must arise from certain determinate causes and
principles of which we are not masters.35
Thus in the operation of belief Hume feels there is a determinate
factor over which we have no control.

32
33

~··
~··

I, III,S; I, III,9; and I, IV, 2.
I, IV, 2.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid., Appendix.

15
There is also a distinction between belief and imagination, which is
vital inHume's theory of knowledge.

In the first distinction Hume asserts

that
The belief or assent, which always attends the
memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those
perceptions they present; and this alone distinguishes
them from the imagination.36
A further explanation of the distinction between belief and imagination
is found in the Inquiry.
The difference between fiction and belief lies
in some sentiment, or feeling which is annexed to the
latter, not to the former, and which depends not on
the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must
be excited by nature, like all other sentiments; and
must arise from the particular situation in which the
mind is placed at any particular juncture.37
Thus, Hume continues, whenever any object is presented to the memory,
it i'lll1lediately by force of custom carries the imagination to conceive the
object, which is usually joined to it.

This conception is attended with a

feeling or sentiment that is different from any of the loose reveries of the
fancy.

This is the whole nature of belief. 38

The third major doctrine in Hume's philosophy concerns the nature of
, knowledge.
First, knowledge consists only in the comparison of ideas.
that he defines knowledge in the

s.

36

~·•

I, III,

37

~·•

Inquiry, V, II.

38

Ibid.

s~e

Hume admits

way as those philosophers who consider

~----~------------------~------~
16
knowledge to be evidence arising from the comparison of ideas.

And lest

there be any misunderstanding, in the same section, in fact in the same
paragraph, he again states his position: "By knowledge I mean the assurance
arising from the comparison of ideas."39
Therefore, since Hume has already asserted that only perceptions exist,
and that the mind is nothing but a heap or collection of these perceptions
united by relations, it follows that ideas, which form the essence of
knowledge, and are themselves "perceptions", must in the nature of the case
also involve certain relationships; and thus knowledge is nothing but a
subjectiye comparison of ideas.
Again, knowledge is reduced to probability.

For since the mind knows

only its own perceptions, and since _all are within the soul of man, the
conclusion is quite final, namely, that knowledge is reduced to a mere matter
of probability.

To this conclusion Hume devotes considerable attention.

Since our reason is to be considered a kind of cause, of which truth is the
natural consequence, and truth may frequently be missed because of the
irruption of other causes, as well as by the constancy of our minds, the
conclusion becomes evident, for
By this means all knowledge degenerates into
probability; and this probability is greater or less,
according to our experience of the veracity or deceitfulness of our understanding, and according to the
simplicity or intricacy of the question.40

39

Hume, Treatise, I,III,ll.

40

~.,

I, IV, 1.

~----------------------------------~
17
The argument is further developed by showing that in all demonstrative
sciences there are rules which are certain and infallible.

But when we

apply these rules our fallible and uncertain faculties are liable to enter in
and thus result in error.

This argmnent he develops by an exa.r.tple from math-

ematics:
There is no algebraist, no mathematician, so
expert in his science, as to place entire confidence
in any truth immediately upon discovery of it, nor
regard it as anything but a mere probability. Every
tL~e he runs over his proofs, his confidence increases;
but still more by the approbation of friends. Now it
is evident that this gradual increase of assurance is
nothing but the addition of new probabilities. 4 1
After showing the same situation to exist in numbers, he concludes
that therefore all our knowledge resolves itself into probabilities.
is the basis for such a conclusion?

lYhat

Here Hume presents three reasons for the

probability and uncertainty of knowledge.
First, the original uncertainty inherent in the subject.

Then also the

uncertainty derived from the weakness of that faculty which judges, and
third, the possibility of error in the estimation we make of truth and the
fidelity of our faculties. 42
Therefore, since all our knowledge is only a matter of probability, and
as Hume has already stated, since the senses are in opposition to reason,
and that neither of them can be defended, he is now ready for his conclusion.
What is the conclusion, and to what end is his whole discussion of our knowledge of the external world?

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.

He answers in summary:

18
~~ intention then •••• is only to make the reader
more sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all
our reasonings concerning causes and effects are derived
from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly
an act of the sensitive than of the cogitative part of
our nature.43

From Hume's analysis of reason, the bnportance of belief and the
doctrine of knowledge, we may proceed to his fourth major doctrine, that of
the imagination.

His view of the imagination is basic to his solution of

the problem of the external world.

He himself admits that the imagination

is "the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy." 44

In fact, Price

holds that "the word 'imagination,' is the keyword to Hume's whole theory
of knowledge." 4 5
Since all impressions are internal, that is, subjective, the belief or
notion, as he terms it, of their distinct and continued existence must come
from the agreement of some qualities with the imagination. 46
~Vhen

any impression has been present with the mind it appears again as

an idea, and this takes place in one of two ways.

'V'Ihen it appears again it

may retain a considerable degree of its original liveliness, somewhat between
an impression or an idea, or perhaps it may lose that liveliness and remain
a perfect idea.

The faculty by which the impressions are repeated the first

43

Ibid.

44

~·•

45

H.H. Price, Hume's
Oxford, 1940, 15.

46

Hume, I,IV,2.

I, IV,4. ,
Theory~~

External World.

Clarendon Press,

19
way is called memory, while that of the

second~

imagination.

Thus, it is

obvious that the ideas of the memory are more lively and strong than those
of the imagination.47
However, it is well to remember that neither the ideas of memory nor
imagination, that is neither the lively nor the faint ideas, can appear in
the mind, unless their concurrent impressions have gone before them to prepare the way.

48

One other aspect of the imagination must be kept in mind.

It seems that

the imagination has the power of choice as well as of suggestion and its free
play is almost boundless.

Hume describes it thus:

Nothing is more admirable than the readiness with
which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents
them at the very instant at which they become necessary
or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe
to the other, in collecting those ideas which belong
alone to any subj~ct. One would think that the whole
intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our
view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as were
proper for our purpose.49
Thus the whole ph'ilosophic system of Hume centers around these four
major doctrines: reason, belief, knowledge and the imagination.
Reason, Hume holds, is and ought to be the slave of the passions.
are two kinds of reason, demonstrative and moral reasoning.

Furbher, it is

impossible to defend either reason or the senses, since there is a total

48

Ibid.

49

~·~ I, I, 7.

There

20

opposition between them, and the reason is limited in that it is unable to
give the least degree of evidence in support of any proposition, either
in philosophy or in ordinary life•
Belief is nothing but a strong and lively idea associated and derived
from impressions, and is an act of the mind arising from custom.

There are

two natural beliefs, that bodies have a continuing and independent existence,
and that these bodies are operative one upon another.

In its operation

belief is merely a certain feeling or sentiment, not dependent upon the will,
but arises from determ.inate causes over which we have no control.
Knowledge consists only in the comparison of

i~eas,

and since this

comparison is a subjective process, all knowledge is reduced to probability.
The imagination is the ultimate judge of all philosophy, and is to be
distinguished from the memory, in that memory consists in more forceful
ideas, while the imagination involves less lively ideas, in fact, it may lose
that liveliness and thus become a perfect idea.
If reason is not a faculty but only a slave of passion, and belief is
only a matter of impressions, which in turn are perceptions arising in the
mind of man, Hume has committed himself to a sensist theory of knowledge.
The imagination, moreover, which becomes the faculty by which we attribute
continued and distinct existences, gives no certainty beyond natural belief.
Whether or not Hume has validly reduced reason, demonstrative knowledge,
and belief to the level of ideas and impressions, we shall reserve to our
final chapter. What we have presented here is the basis - the only basis,
on which Hume can hope to account for a real world independent of the world
of thought.

Can knowledge, as Hume explains it, solve the problem of the

21
external world?
David Hume posed the problem and likewise solved the problem in his own
fashion.

We must now turn to his solution.

CHAPTER II
HUME 1 S SOLlJT ION TO TEE PROBLE)JI OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD

Hume' s solution of the problem of the external world involves two
questions; first, why is it that we attribute a continued existence to
objects, even when they are not present to the senses?

Furthermore, why

do we suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind and

perception~

Thus he begins his studywith the following paragraph1
The subject, then, of our present inquiry concerning
the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of
the body; and my reasonings under this head, I shall begin
with a distinction which at first sight may seem superfluous, but which will contribute very much to the perfect
understanding of what follows. We ought to examine apart
these two questions which are co~~only confounded together,
viz, Why we attribute a continued existence to objects,
even when they are not present to the senses; and why we
suppose them to have an existence distinct from the mind
and perception? Under this head I comprehend their
situation as well as relations, their external position
as well as the independence~f their existence and operation. 1
These two questions Hume considers to be intimately connected, and
there are two reasons for their close relationships.

First of all, if the

objects of the senses continue their existence, even when they are not
perceived, it follows that their existence is of course independent of and
distinct from the perceptions; and also vice versa, if they exist inde-

1
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pendently of the perception and distinct from it, then of course they must
continue to exist, even when they are not perceived.

But though the decision

of the one question decides the other, still in order that we may "more
easily discover the principles of human nature, from whence this decision
arises," we shall carry along this distinction. 2
After thus stating the problem, Hume proceeds to his solution.

He does

not admit the acceptance of the external world to be anything but belief.
There are only three possible ways of approach, for we arrive at the belief
in the external world, either by the senses, or by reason, or by the
.

.

mag~na

t'~on. 3

As for the senses, they are incapable of giving any notion of the
continued existence of their objects, for the following three reasons:
The senses can only produce opinion of a distinct existence, not of a
continued existence.

For Hume, it is obvious that the senses are incapable

of giving any opinion regarding the continued existence of their objects,
after they are no longer present to the senses.

To do so, the senses would

have to continue to operate after they have ceased to operate.
Hence, the senses could only produce the opinion of a distinct, but not
of a continued existence.

And if they are thus to function, they must either

present their impressions as images and representations, or else as distinct
and external existences.

2
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T~ese are the only questions which are intelligible on the present subject.
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But the senses convey only single impressions.

For it is evident that

our senses do not convey impressions as images of something distinct, or
independent and external, because they show us nothing but a single perception
~nd

never intimate anything more than that.

And a single perception can

produce the idea of double existence, except as it is done by inference

~ever
~ither

by reason or the imagination.

By double existence Hume simply means

~he

continued existence of objects after they have ceased to be perceived by

~he

senses.
The third reason Hume presents for asserting the incapacity of the senses

to give any notion of a continued existence is due to the fac·t, that if the
senses convey any idea of a distinct existence, it must be conveyed by a kind
of fallacy or illusion.
All sensations are felt by the mind, and

v~en

we are not sure that they

present themselves as distinct objects, or as mere Lmpressions, the difficulty
lies not in their nature, but rather in their relations and situations.

Now

if it were possible for the senses to present our impressions as external to
and distinctly independent of ourselves, both the objects as well as ourselves would have to be evident to our senses; otherwise they could not be
compared by these faculties. 4
It is at this point that Hume raises the question which is at the center
of our sense knowledge and determines it,
the objects of our s enses?"

5

na~ely,

"How far are we ourselves

He does admit the complexity of this issue, for

he is sure that "there is no question in philosophy more abstruse than that
~------------------4 Ibid.

5
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concerning identity, and the nature of the uniting principle, which constitutes a person." 6

Further he concedes that the senses are not adequate to

determine this question, but that rather, "we must have recourse to the most
profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory answer to it."7

However, in

ordinary life, these ideas of self and person are never very definite or
determinate.

Yet he dismisses the issue by concluding that "it is absurd

therefore to imagine the senses can ever distinguish betwixt ourselves and
external objects."8

Thus Hume concludes that our senses are unable to give

us any notion of continued existence, since
They cannot operate beyond the extent in which
they operate ••••We may therefore conclude with certainty,
that the opinion of a continued existence never arises
from the senses.9
In the Inquiry Hume maintains the

s~~e

view regarding the senses.

He

has been dealing with the scepticism that arises from science and inquiry.

-

The arguments of the sceptics are presented, or, as he terms it, the more
trite problems presented by the sceptics of all times against the evidence
of sense, such as the imperfection and fallaciousness of our sense organs
on many occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in the water; the
deceptive appearance of objects viewed from various distances, and the double

6

Ibid.

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid.

9

Hume, Inquirz, XII,l.

r------~----~

'

26

image which comes from pressing one eye, and many other similar appearances.
These arguments of the sceptics 1 according to Hume,, are evidence enough to
shOW that the senses alone are not to be implicitly depended upon.

However,

he continues, it seams evident that men are carried along by a natural
impulse to have faith in their senses and that, without reason, we suppose
there is an external world, which is not dependent upon our perceptions but
would exist even though no sensible creatures existed.
But our senses alone cannot give us such knowledge of the external
world.

Thus, he concludes that the senses are incapable of producing

an

opinion of the continued existence of objects.
Hume now turns his attention to the consideration of reason.

He main-

tains that reason is likmvise incapable of producing any opinion concerning
the objects existing independently of the mind.

Here again he presents

several arguments, which he feels are sufficient to establish his position.
First, if reason were sufficient, it would, still only be valid for the
philosophers, and they are but few.

Furthermore their views would not

greatly influence the majority of mankind in general.

So that whatever

convincing arguments philosophers might think they could adduce to confirm
their belief in the existence of objects independent of the mind, it is quite
obvious that these arguments would not be able to persuade peasants, children,
nor the large majority of maru(ind to attribute objects to some of their
impressions, and yet not to others. 10
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Then

again~

the view of the philosophers is contrary, in this respect,

to the view of the vulgar.
All the conclusions which the vulgar are found to hold concerning objects
existing independently of the mind are directly contrary to those held by
philosophers.

For the philosophers, according to Hume, maintain that every-

thing which appears is nothing but a perception, and therefore is interrupted
and independent of the mind; whereas the vulgar, by whom Hume means those
he has previously described as children, peasants and the majority of mankind,
contuse what they perceive with the things they feel and which they see have
a distinct and continued existence.

Since, however, this view is unreasonable

the senttment of the distinct existence of external bodies must come from
some other faculty besides reason. 11
Since reason is the faculty which judges and which enables a philosopher
to explain his views, the question naturally arises, why does Hume treat
reason with such brevity, and why does he dismiss it with such ease?

The

answ·er to both of these questions can be gathered by a more complete description of reason as found in his works.

There are several statements of Hume

which show why for him reason is insufficient to give us any notion of
external objects.
First, reason is nothing but a kind of sensation.
All probable reasoning is nothing but a species of
sensations. It is not solely in poetry and music that
we must follow our taste and sentL~ent, but likewise in

11
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philosophy. When I am convinced of any principle 1 it
· is only an idea which strikes more strongly upon me.
When I give preference to one set of arguments over
another, I do nothing but decide my feeling concerning
the superiority of their influence. 1 .
Hence, all reasoning is just .a matter of feeling.
Again, reason is nothing but an "instinct."

He describes it as being

Nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct
in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of
ideas, and endows them with particular situations and
relations .13
In the light of both of these texts., it becomes evident that to Hum.e
reason is no criterion of truth 1 as far as philosophy is concerned.
reason is likened to taste and

I
I

~ancy,

For

and is a matter of preference.

Reason

is "nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct."
Reason resolves itself into custom.

Hume holds that all reasonings

are nothing but the effects of "custom", and the only influence of this

I

custom is that it enlivens the imagination, thus strengthening the conception
of any object.

And he holds that reason is nothing but a matter of "habit".

which in turn has no influence except to enliven the imagination.

In his

Inquiry he further describes the process of reasoning as follows:
In all reasonings from experience there is a step
taken by the mind, which is not supported by any argument
or process of the understanding; there is no danger that
these reasonings on which almost all knowledge depends will
ever be effected by this discovery.l4
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The above statement is followed by several illustrations by which Hume
attempts to substantiate his description.

He cites the exrunple of a person

coming into the world endowed with the strongest faculties and argues that
his conclusions concerning the continued succession of objects would be
merely that they exist, but no further discovery could be made.

Now what is

that step taken by the mind that is not supported either by reason or
understanding?

To this question Hume answers that the principle here in-

volved is simply custom or habit, and his reason seems quite evident.

For

whenever any particular act is repeated, there is always a tendency to repeat
again,

witho~t

being impelled by reason or understanding, and whenever this

takes place, we always say that this tendency is the result of custom.

So

that custom becomes the great guide of life.l 5
Finally, reason is a slave of the passions.

Hume feels that we do not

speak accurately or philosophically when we refer to the conflict between
passion and reason, for he asserts that
Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than
to serve and obey them.l8
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Smith, 45. Concerning this statement of reason
as a slave to the passions, Smith states that
this becomes the maxim of all of Hume's philosophy.
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Thus Hume begins wi~h the senses~ ~howing the lL~itation of the senses
in solving the problem of the external world.

For the senses can produce

opinion of a distinct existence, but not of a continued existence.

Further-

more the senses convey but single impressions, and if the senses were to
convey any impression of a continued existence it would have to be by way
of fallacy or illusion.

Hence the inadequacy of the senses.

Reason, however is also insufficient to induce our belief in the
existence of the external world, for the judgments of reason are contrary to
the opinions of the vulgar.

And even if reason were sufficient it would be

so only for the few, and not for the majority of mankind.

Having shown that

neither the senses nor reason are sufficient, Hume now turns his attention
to the imagination, and shows that the opinion held of the distinct and
continued existence of objects must be due entirely to the imagination.
Just what does Hume mean by the imagination?

Although he does not give

a precise definition, he does, however, describe the operation of the
imagination as well as show the distinction within the imagination.
First, we have Hume's description of the operation of the imagination.
When any impression has been present with the mind, it appears again as an
idea, and this may take place in two different ways; either, when it appears
again~

it retains a considerable degree of its original liveliness, and

somewhat between an impression or an idea; or when it loses that liveliness
and remains a perfect idea.

The faculty by which the impressiona are

repeated in the first way is called memory, while the second is called
imagination.

\

It is obvious that the ideas of the memory are more lively and

strong than those of the imagination, and also that the memory paints its

r,-------~
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objects in more distinct colors than any used by the imagination.l 7
Hume also shows a distinction in the imagination in the operation of
two principles on at least two different

~evels.

I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the
princi9les which are permanent, irresistible, an~ universal; such as the customary transition from causes to
effects and fro~ effects to causes; and the principles
which are changeable, weak and irregular •••• the former
are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so
that upon their removal human nature would L~ediately
perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful
in the conduct of life; but on the contrary are observed
to take place only in weak minds, and being opposite
t~ the principles of custom and reasoning, may be easily
subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this
reason the former are received by philosophy and the
latter rejected.l8
In the immediate context Hume illustrates both of these principles.

The permanent and irresistible principles are evident when anyone concludes
that somebody is near him, when he hears a definite voice in the dark.

He

reasons justly and naturally, even though his conclusion be derived from
nothing but custom, which "infixes and enlivens the idea

o~human

creature,

on account of his conjunction with the present ~npression." 19
The changeable, weak and irregular principles of the imagination are
at work

~hen

one is tormented for reasons he knows not why, with the

"apprehension of spectres in the dark, may be perhaps said to reason, and
to reason naturally too, but then it must be in the same sense that a malady
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is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, though it be contrary
20
to hea lth , th e mos t agreeabl e an d mos t na t ura 1 s1•t ua t•1on o f man.

Hume's third explanation of the imagination deals with tts scope of
operation, e.nd it is at this point that he show·s the free e.nd almost unbounded
scope in the operation

or

the imagination.

flume's own description is as rollows:
Nothing is more admirable than the readiness with
which the ime.gination suggests its ideas and presents them
at the very instant in which they become necessary or
useful. The fancy runs rrom one end or the universe ·to
the other, in collecting those ideas which alone belong
to any subject. One would think the whole intellectual
world or ideas was at once subjected to our view, and
that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper
for our purpose. There may not, however, be any present,
besides those very ideas, that are thus collected by a kind
of magical faculty of the soul, which though it be always
perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what
we call genius, is, however, inexpl~yable by the utmost
efforts or the human understanding.
Thus, to Hume, the imagination see.ms to possess the capacity of
suggestion as well as choice, and though that power is perrect in the genius,
it is nevertheless inexplicable by the human understanding.
Having considered Hume's explanation

or

the Lmagination, including his

description, the distinction within the operation of the imagination, as well
as its scope, we now turn to consider the emphasis he places upon the imagination.

He rurther develops his position, that the

~.agination

provides the

basis ror our belief in the external world, by a three-rold emphasis.
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First, since all impressions are internal and perishing existences, the
notion of their distinct and continued existence must arise from a concurrence of some of their qualities with the qualities of the imagination.22
As all our im.pressions are internal, that is subjective, and appearing
that way, the notion of their

disti~ct

and continued existence must come

from the comparison of those impressions to which we attribute a distinct
and continued existence, with those which we regard as internal and perish.:.
.

~ng.

23

Hume likewise maintains that we cannot attribute continued existence
to involuntariness and superior force and violence.

Since it is neither

because of the involuntariness of certain impressions, as is commonly
supposed, he asserts, nor because of

th~

superior force and viblence that

we hole that they have a continued existence, which we do not attribute to
others that are more feeble and voluntary.

For it is obvious that we never

suppose our passions and affections, pleasures and pains, to have an
existence b'eyond our perception, although they act with greater violence and
are also involuntary.

24

In Hume' s third and final emphasis .upon the imagination, re h9lds that
there are two qualities, in our i."Tlpressions which make us attribute to them
a·distinct and continued existence, namely constancy and coherence.
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little investigation will show that all objects to which we attribute a
continued existence have a peculie.r constancy which distinguishes them from
the impressions which exist because of our perception.

He continues his

argument by way of illustration.
The mountains, houses, and trees which Hume sees have always appeared
to him in the se.me order.

Whe.:n he loses sight of them by shutting his eyes

or by turning his head, he soon finds them returning to him without any
alteration.

The same is true of his bed, his books, and papers which also

present themselves to him in the same way, and they do not change because
of any interruption or because of his not seeing them.

Thus, Hume reasons,

happens in the case of all those :Lrnpressions wr.ose objects are supposed to
exist externally.

25

Still this constancy is not so perfect as not to admit of change and
certain exceptions.

These exceptions Hume defines by coherence, by which

the changes are dependent upon each other.
point.

Once more he illustrates this

If after an hour's absence, he returns to his chamber, he finds the

fire not as when he left it.

He is accustomed to seeing other changes

whether he is present or absent, near at hand is one of the characteristics
of external objects as well e.s their constancy.26
He now turns to the question of the relationship of constancy and
coherence to the opinion of the continued existence of bodies.

Although

internal impressions also involve coherence, it is not necessa.r;,r from them
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to conclude the existence of external

bodies~

Outer impressions, however,

require a supposed external existence; otherwise they lose the regularity
of their operation.

Ee finds hi.TJlself e.ge.in seated in his chamber, by the

fire, his face to the fire, e.nd all the objects that strike his senses are
within a fsw yards of him.

His

memo~J

does not inform him, to be sure, of

the existence of many objects, but that information does not go be;olond their
past existence, nor do his senses or memorJr give any evidence of the continuance of being.

Vmile sitting and reflecting on these thoughts, he hears

a sudden noise e.s though the door were moving toward him.

This, of course,

gives opportunity for many nevr reflections and reasonings.

First of all,

he had never thought that this noise could possibly come from anything but
the motion of the door.

Thus it would contradict all past experience unless

the door he hears be actually the one he remembers being on the other side
of the chamber. 27
Other factors, of course, are included.

The human body has the quality

of gravity, and there must be stairs for the porter to mount.

So when the

porter hands him e. letter which he perceives by the handwriting and subscription to come from a friend who says he is two hundred leagues distant,
he is sure he cannot account for this phenomenon, like to his experience in
other instances, without spreading out in the mind the whole sea and
continent between us, and supposing the effects and continued existence of
posts e.nd ferries, in the light of his memory end observation.

27
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At eveiJr moment of his life similar instances are presented to him in.
which he must suppose the continued existence of objects, otherwise his
experiences cannot be made consistent with themselves.
supposition possible?

makes this

Hume answers his own question by replying that custom,

though vital and involved, is not sufficient alone.
operating.

~~at

Other factors are also

The i.'tl1agination, as Hume has already observed in mathematics,

when it is set in any particular train of thought, is apt to continue even
when its object fails it.

For the imagination operates

Like a galley slave put in motion by the oars,
carries its course without any new i.mpulse •••• The same
principle makes us easily to Bntertain the opinion of the
continued existence of body. 2
From this description of Hume, there seems to be in the imagination
an impulsive drive that moves the imagination on, once it has begun to
operate in any given situation.

Now no matter how much emphasis Hume has

pl~ced upon coherence, he will not let himself hold that coherence alone is

sufficient, for he confesses its inadequacy in the following manner:

/

I a"Yl afraid it (coherence) is too weak to support
. along so vast an edifice as is the.~ of the continued
existence of all external bodies. 2

It is at this point that Hmn.e reaches the climax of his e.rgument.

We

now know why we attribute a continued existence to objects, even when they
are not present to the senses, and also why we believe them to have an

28
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existence distinct from the mind and perception.

It is because of this

principle of coherence, vnlich Hume adknowledges is not too plausible.

He

must therefore give a more positive explanation of the role of the imagination in producing this belief in the externkl world.
However, he feels that the explanation of this position involves a
considerable compass of profound reasoning, and in short, to avoid confusion,
he thinks it proper to give a short sketch or abridgement of what he calls
11

my system. 11
He now describes his thesis, which he terms as his own system, in

contrast to both the
the vulgar.

vi~¥

of other philosophers, as well as the position of

It is the following opinion:

The opinion of the continued existence of body,
which is prior to that of its definite existence, and
produces the latter principle.30
i'Jhat does Hu.rne mean by the word, principle?

He has already· stated the

impossibility of knowing either universal or ultimate principles.
does he mean?

Yl'hat then

He explains his use of the word principle later in the same

paragraph, as "this supposition, or idea, of continued existence." 3 1
other words, to Rume, a principle means merely a supposition or idea.

In
And

since ideas are but faint images of previous impressions, they can be neither
ultimate nor universal principles, but merely relative to the situation
involved at any given moment.
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Hume then presents a brief outline of his argument, followed by the
four main arguments for his posit,ion, which include: the principle of
individuation; the reason why the resemblance of our broken and interrupted
perceptions induce us to attribute identity to them; the explanation of
that propensity, ·which this illusion gives to unite these broken ·appearances
by a continued existence; and the explanation of the force and vivacity of
conception which arises from this propensity.
He first presents his argument in outline.

The perceptions of the sun,

or ocean, v.tich returr.., after an absence or a:r..nihilat::on witl'_ like parts,
and in like order, we are likely to regard as different.
interruptedness is felt to be difficult.

However, the

In order to free ourselves fron

this difficulty, we disguise the interruptedness as much as possible, or
else remove it altogether, by supposing that these interrupted perceptions
are connected by a real existence of which we are sensible.
this argument with the following

Hume concludes

s~ary:

This supposition, or idea of continued existence,
acquires a force,. and vivacity from the memory of these
unbroken L-npressions, and from the natural tendency to
suppose them to be the same; and according to the past
reasoning, the very essence of belief consists in the
force and liveliness of the conception.32
The four main arguments for Hume's position follow.

First, the

principle of individuation.
The viev: we have of any single object is not sufficient to convey the
idea of identity, for one single object conveys the idea of unity, but not
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of identity.

A nu.rnber of objects can never convey this idea., however much

they :nay be supposed to resemble each other.

Since then both nu.mber and uni-

ty are incompatible with the relation of identity, the latter must lie in
something that is .neither of them.
since between number and

~nity,

But t!lis seems at i'irst sight impossible,

there can be no medium.

To solve this

difficulty Hume refers once more to the time factor, or duration.

Time has

reference to succession and ;vhen applied to any unchangeable object.

The

only way it is possible for any unchangeable object to 1::·e supposed to participate in the changes of co-existent objects, and particularly in that of
our

~Jerceptions,

is by a fiction of the imagination.

Hume feels that this

fiction does not universally take place, and only thus is it possible that
a single object placed before us, and observed for any length of time without
our discovery of any variation or interruption in it, is able to give a.
notion of identity.

He concludes this argument on the principle of indivi-

dua.tion as follows:
The principle of individuation is nothing but the
inva.ria.bleness and uninterruptedness of any object, through
a. supposed variation of ti.rne, which the mind can trace it
in different periods of its existence, without any break
of the view, and without being obliged to form any idea
of multiplicity of number.33
The second argument involves the reason why the resemblance of our
broken and interrupted perceptions induces us to attribute an identity to
them.

33
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In presenting this argument, Hume again takes the position of the vulgar

in order, as he feels, to avoid all ambiguit;r and confusion.
imagination is vital in the explanation.
:-tis cha"!lber surve:>ring his furniture.

Here again the

Once more Hume finds hLmself in

He shuts his eyes and after a while

opens them again, whereupon he finds new perceptions to resemble perfectly
i

those which formerly struck his

sen~es.

This resemblance is observed,

according to Hume, in a thousand instances, and naturally together with these
ideas of those interrupted perceptions by the strongest relations, enables
the mind to pass from one to another vvith an easy transition.

The whole of

t:lis phenomenon he explains by means of the operation of the L"!lagination.
This he

s~arizes

in the following brief but Lmportant paragraph:

An easy transition or passage of the imagination
along the ideas of these different and uninterrupted
perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with
that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted
perception. It is therefore very natural to mistake the
one for the other.34
In a footnote to the above explanation, Hume admits that his reasoning

is somewhat abstruse and difficult to understand, but he Lrnm.ediately contends
that this

ve~J

difficulty can be converted into a proof in favor of his

argwnent, for he shows that there are two different relationships at work,
both of which are resemblances.
perceptions.

34
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The first of these is the resemblance of

Vfuile the second is the resemblance
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1fuich the act of the mind in surveying a succession
of resembling objects bears to that in surveying an
identical object. Now these resemblances we are apt to
confound with each other; and it i~ natural we should
according to this very reasoning.3
He concludes his second argument with a still further explanation of
the operation of the imagination.

Here he shows how, by the smooth passage

of the imagination along the ideas of resembling
led to ascribe to the.m-a perfect identity.

perceptions~

The interrupted

we are easily

map_~er

they appear makes us consider them as so many resembling but still
beings, appearing after certain intervals.
this

contradiction~

in which
distinct~

We find ourselves perplexed by

and thus have a certain tendency to untie these broken

appearances by the fiction of a continued existence. 36
The third argument considers the account for that propensity which
t~is

illusion

gives~

to unite these broken appearances by a continued

existence.
Hume makes clear that the real issue is not concerning the matter of
fact, that is, whether the mind actually forms a conclusion from its
perceptions, but only regarding the way in "'l:tlich the conclusion is
and the principles from which it is derived.
of mankind, including philosophers

themselves~

reached~

He feels sure that ahtost all
for the large part of their

lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose that
the very being which is then present to the mind is actue.lly the real body

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.
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of material existence.

Hume is also sure that this perception or object is

assumed to have a continued and uninterrupted existence 6 and not to be
annihilated by our absence, nor to be brought again into existence by our
presence.

'.\ben we are not present with

it~

we still say it exists 6 even

though we do not feel it or see it, vmile when we are present we say we see
it and we feel it.37
The fourth and final argument deals with the explanation of the force
and vivacity of conception which arises from the propensity.

He believes

that an intelligent reader will find it easier to accept his system than to
understand it fully and distinctly, and will after a while with little
reflection admit that every part of his argument carries its own proof along
with it.

He feels it is obvious, as the vulgar suppose, that their

perceptions are their only objects, yet at the same time they believe the
continued existence of

matter~

that is upon the basis of the supposition

that we must account for the origin of this belief.
Based upon this supposition 6 it is a false opinion that any of our
objects or perceptions are identically the same after their interruptions,
and consequently the opini:Jn of their identity can never arise from reason 6
but must necessarily arise from the imagination.

The only way the imagina-

tion is seduced into such an opinion is because of the resemblance of certain
perceptions, which we have a tendency to suppose the

37

Ibid.

s~me.

This tendency

43

to consider our resembling perceptions identical results in the fiction of
a continued existence 1 since that fiction as well as the identity is
actually false, as all philosophers acknowledge.
effect than to remedy

~1e

And thus it has no other

interruption of our perceptions, which is the

only condition that is contrary to their identity.

38

Tnus we find Iiume's solution to the problem of the external world to
be based not on sensation, nor on reason 1 but rather on the belief in the
distinct existence of the world in the imagination.

•
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CHAPTER III

THE P..EASOUS FOR HU11E 1 S POSIT IOU
iVhat are some of the reasons for Hume's position, and how did he arrive
at his conclusions?

In this chapter we shall deal with these questions, in

a consideration of the claim of Hume to originality,
of other philosophers upon his thought.
theory of knowledge.

~s

well as the influe

For Hume is not alone in his

Other thinkers before him influenced his position,

particularly Locke and Berkeley.

Hume follows Locke, who is more consistent

than Berkeley.
Hume claims for himself a certain amount of
his system of philosophy, as nmy sys t em. nl

originali~J•

He refers to

Also when referring to the

imagination as the ultimate judge of all philosophy, he begins with the
statement, "according to my philosophy. " 2

Furthermore in the Introduction

to the Treatise, he professes to be establishing "a complete system of
sciences, built upon foundation~ almost entirely new." 3
That other philosophers influenced Hume is evident from a comparison
of the works of other writers who preceded him, as well as his own
references and also acknowledgements to other men.

1 Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2.
2

Ibid., I,IV,3.

3

Ibid., Introduction.
44

Although no doubt,
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many thinkers influenced Hume, consideration here is given only to those
\~10

seem most directly involved, the chief of these, being John Locke and

George Berkeley.

As is to be expected, Hume admits the influence of other

thinkers upon his thought.
The first of these references is found in the Introduction to the
Treatise, where Hume remarks that

N~.

Locke (who is given consideration

later in this chapter), my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. :Mandeville, Mr. Hutcheson,
Dr. Butler, etc. had indeed commenced a great work, to which he feels his
own work will be a contribution. 4

4

Ibid.
Hendel. In Chapter III, 95, Hendel s~~arizes the
influence of the above named writers upon
Hum.e.
Their preoccupation was almost entirely
with the life of sentL~ent and morals.
Shaftesbury studied the Characteristics
of ]!J:en, Manners, Opinions, Times •
Mandeville likened man to animals in his
Fables of the Bees. Hutcheson started
his career with an Inquiry into the Original
of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, deploring
in his preface the almost universal interest of philosophers in the understanding hence his later work, An Essay on the Nature
of the Passions and Affections. Jl~d Bishop
Butler gave to the world his Sermons on
Nature, portraying man as fundamentally a
creature of impulse like the animals and
achieving moral excellence only by "conscience," which is a wise reflection upon
the complete meaning of our personal life.

r
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'

Hume was also influenced by what he himself describes as "the
}Jewtonian Philosophy. "

5

However, this single reference to Nevrton is not

alone in indicating Hume's indebtedness to him, for his whole approach by
way of e:xperiment is newtonian.

In his Introduction to the Treatise, he

describes this method of experiment:
Vfuen I am at a loss to know the effects of one
body upon another in any situation, I need only put
them in any situation, and observe what results from
it.S
There remains still another aspect in which Hume was influenced by
}Jewton; in his proposal to develop a static and dyna..-rnics of the mind,
modelled on the pattern of the newtonian physics, and in which the association of' ideas is conceived as Hume describes it, by
A kind of attraction, which in the mental world
will be fom1d to have as extraordinary effects as in
the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as
various forms.7
The influence of Father Malebranche is also evidenced in Hume's

6

~.,

Introduction.
Smith describes the influence of Newton upon Hume
in the following manner when he states: "Hume
contrives to combine reliance on experiment with
the conviction that the ultL~ate secrets of nature
are permanently witheld from human view. Experiments, Hume teaches, is the final court of appeal
in all matters of fact."

7

~.,

I,I,4. and also Smith, 71.
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analysis of cause and effect, so well sunrnarized by Gilson:
Hume a?pl2ed his analysis to the idea of cause
and effect, with the result that he could find
nothing essential in that idea, but a relation of
contiguity, or succession between what we call cause
and effect •••••1~at is there in our mind, for instance,
which answers to the word, efficacy? Malebranche,
to whom Hume himself expressly refers at this point,
had conclusively proved that no philosopher has ever
been able to explain the so-called "secret force and
energy of causes."8
It is likewise evident that the writings of Cicero had influenced
Hume,

~1ich

he

aQ~its

in a letter, dated on September 17, 1739, while still

engaged in the completion of his Treatise. 9
In Thomas Hobbes, Hume had already seen evidence of the place and
10
importance of the :imaginetion.

Unity~ ~lilosophical

Experience., 216 and 217.

8

Gilson, The

9

Charles W. Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume., Princeton
University Press, 1925, 9 1 . - Hume writes: I had indeed the former book (Cicero's
Offices) in MY eye in all my reasonings. And in the
same letter - You are a great aQ~irer or Cicero as
well as I am. Please to review the fourth book of
De Finnibus et Malorum.

10

Ibid., 75. In referring to Hobbes' influence on Hume, he writes:
ThO:mas Hobbes was another figure in whose v~itings Hume had already
discovered a fallacious argument to prove the necessity of a cause
for every event •••• Hobbes saw in the activity of the senses that of
the imagination is the most significant capacity of our human mind.
It gives rise to both single and compound thoughts. When we direct
our imagination by means of words or other vocabulary signs, we have
that special phase of mind we call mental discourse or understanding.
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One cannot consider the thinkers who influenced Hume without including
Francis Bacon.

Hendel presents considerable evidence to indicate that some

of Hume's scepticism was no doubt derived from Bacon.

In his work,

The Great Instauration, Bacon avows himself an improved Academic Sceptic.
To hLm the sceptical attitude is a state of mind preparatory to a methodical
knowledge, and doubt defends philosophy against error, for it calls attention
to what needs to be considered more carefully.

He vigorously defends the

method of experiment and holds that we are to trust the first deliverances of
the senses.

Thus Bacon mainte.ins that the natural judgment of man upon his

perception is right.

The chief task, according to Bacon, becomes the ability

to produce data of our knowledge by investigation and experiment. 11
Though these other thinkers, no doubt, influenced Hume, the most direct
and definite influence upon Hume's thought was the influence of Locke and
Berkeley, whom we now consider.
Before considering the influence of Locke and Berkeley upon Hume, it is
notevvorthy that Locke, in turn, was greatly influenced by Descartes.

In

fact Locke's own account of his debt to Descartes is clearly revealed in a
letter to Stillingfleet, who had inferred that Locke was not original in his

11

~.,

40 and 41.
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essay, but had rather shown undue dependence upon Descartes. 12
This is in complete agreement with the account Lady Masham gives of
her conversation with Locket
The first books, as Locke himself told me, which
gave hlln a relish of philosophical things, were those
of Descartes. He rejoiced in reading them, because,
though he often differed in opinion from this writer,
yet he found what he said ve~J intelligible.l3
Thus, though Locke attributes his philosophical awakening to Descartes,
though he differs from h:L11 in many respects, still, "the whole conception of
idee.s as proper objects of knowledge is Cartesian in origin. nl4
Pringle-Pattison agrees with this view, and states that the whole of
modern philosophy may be said to begin with the subjective note of Descartes.

12

James Gibson, Locke's Theory ~ Knowledge ~ Its Historical Relations.
Cambridge University Press, 1917, 205.
Locke replied: "Though I must acknowledge to that
justly a~~ired gentleman, the great obligation
of my first deliverance from the unintelligible
way of talking philosophy in use in the schools
of his time, yet I am far from entitling his
-v.rritings to any of the errors of imperfections
which are found in my essay, as deri::ving their
original from him that I must own to your lordship they were spun barely out of my own mind,
and the ideas I had there, were not, that I know,
derived from any other original. 11

13

~·· 206.

14

Ibid., 207. For full account, see the whole of Chapter IX, entitled
Locke and Descartes.

50
His celebrated and much praised starting-point is
in reality a false, or at all events an inadequate
foundation for philosophy, for it apparently affirms
the independent existence of that which, when separated
from the world, cannot be otherwise regarded than a mere
abstraction. As Descartes describes it, 'I exist, how
often? As often as I think. For perhaps it would even
happen, i f I should wholly cease to think, that I should
at the sa~e time altogether cease to be.' In other words,
thinking, then, is whereby I exist, or as Descartes
expressed it, I am a being whose essence consists in
thinking.l5
However, it is well to
be~reen

rem~nber

that whatever differences there are

Descartes and Locke concerning innate ideas, "they are at one in the

funda.:mental poL"'lt that the sole object of the mind's knowledge is its own
.d eas. "16

~

Locke is not concerned with the difficulties regarding either the
general nature of the mind, nor the special mechanism of perception.

These,

he feels, are matters of speculation and out of reach. 17
His first purpose is to

rejec~

the hypothesis of innate ideas, and in

place of these ideas, he holds that the mind is
At first perfectly rasa tabula, quite void, but
altogether capable of those characteristics, notions or
ideas, which are the proper objects of our understandings
wherein our knowledge consists, and beJrond which we have
not any knowledge at all.l8

15

Pringle Pattison, Scottish Philosophy. ! Comparison~~ Scottish
and German Answers to Hume. William Blackwood and Sons, London, 1899,9,10

16

James Orr, David Hume and His Influence 2E. Philosophy~ Theology•
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1903, 37.

17

John Locke, An Ess2y Concerning_ Human Understanding. William Tegg
London, 1853, I,I, •

18

Ibid.

~:

Co.,

r
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Here Locke differs from Descartes, who taught that from the very nature
of our mind, it followed necessarily that ideas are innate.
Descartes mean?
for

exa~ple,

What ideas did

The first principles of all being and of thought, such as

what is, is; and that the same thing cannot be and not be at

the same time•

To which Locke replied, that children, idiots, and even

normal men die without ever knowing those principles.

Still they have

souls and minds, and how could those notions be imprinted upon their minds
without their knowing them?
not even the idea of God.

So Locke concludes that no ideas are innate,
It is at this point that Gilson remarks that the

fate of Cartesian philosophy is a settled thing.

For Descartes had held

that it is necessary for the soul always to think, and if necessary, it
ought always to be.

However, the soul no more always thinks, than the

body moves at all ti"!les.

Even to state that the soul is nothing but a

thinking substance is not even evident, for the soul not only thinks, but
also wills, and has the power of putting the body into motion, that is
. •ty. 19
mo t J.VJ.

Having shown that there are no innate ideas, Locke proceeds to show
that the two and only two foundations of all knowledge are experience and
obser.vation.

19

Gilson,

~Unity~

Philosouhical Experience, 167-169.

l
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Thus I think that all our knowledge is founded on
and ultimately derives itself from experience and
observation, employed either about external, sensible
objects, or the internal operations of our minds,
perceived by ourselves; which are the two originals
and fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas
we have, or can have, do spring.20
Since our minds have no innate ideas, how then do we arrive at
knowledge?

Locke answers that if we

all come fromtwo main sources,

exfu~ine

n~~ely

our ideas we find that they

sensations and reflection.

Ideas of

reflection are such as perceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning
and willing, and in general all ideas which are not sensible are ideas of
reflection, whereas ideas of sensation depend wholly upon our senses.

Thus

Locke describes how these ideas come into being.
Our senses are conversant about particular sensible
objects, do convey into the mind several distinct ideas
of images of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects affect them. P~d thus we come by those
ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, hard, soft,
ache, smart, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call
sensible qualities. And this great source of most of the
ideas we have depending wholly upon our senses and derived
by them to our understanding, I call sensation.21
Hume agrees with Locke that all the data of the human mind consists
in reflections and sensations.

He does, however, disagree with Locke as to

the meaning of impressions and ideas.

The basic difference goes back to

his full disagreement with Locke on the question of innate ideas.

This

variance with Locke is of such importance that Rume gives considerable

20

Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II,I,2.

21

~·•

II, I,3.
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analysis of his view concerning innate ideas.

The reasons for his

disagreement with Locke are clearly presented in the Inquirv in the
following analysis :
For what is meant by innate? If innate be
equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and
ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or
natural, in whatever sense we take tl."te latter word,
whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial,
or miraculous. If by innate is meant, contemporary to
our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it
worthy to enquire at what tL~e thinking begins, whether
before, at, or after our birth. Again the word idea
seems to be conunonly taken in a very loose sense by
Locke and others; as standing for any of our perceptions,
our sensations and :Passions, as well as thoughts. Now
in this sense I should desire to know what can be meant
by asserting that self-love, or resentment of injuries,
or the passion between the sexes is not innate?
But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas,
in the sense above explained, and understanding by
innate what is original or copied from no precedent
perception, then may we assert that all our impressions
are innate, and our ideas not innate.22
Thus instead of making our ideas stand for all of our perceptions,
Hume clearly states that all of our perceptions are impressions.

In a

footnote to this exposition, Hume definitely describes this break with the
position of Locke. 23

He further admits that his theory of impressions

22

Hume, Inquiry, I,2.

23

, Treatise, I,I,l. In a footnote HQ~e makes the following
state.menti I here make use of these terms, L~pressions and ideas, in
a different sense from what is usual, and I hope this liberty will be
allowed me. Perhaps I had rather restorethe word idea to its original
sense, from which Mr. Locke had perverted it, in making it stand for
our perceptions. By the term of impression, I would not be understood
to express the manner in which our lively perceptions are produced in
the soul, but merely the perceptions themselves; for which there is no
particular name in the English, or any other language that I know.
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is singular, in that it has not been held before. 24
Locke continues to describe the ideas of sensation.

As they come

into the mind they are simple, and never confused, or complex, while all
those ideas not s,imple are claimed by Locke to be compounded of simple
ideas. 25
After thus

desc~ibing

how ideas come into the mind, Locke proceeds to

consider the relationship between the ideas and the objects of which they
are ideas.

Here he finds it necessary to draw an important distinction

between the two kinds of simple ideas.

Some of them are of primary

qualities, and these resemble qualities which in reality belong to the
object.

By

quali~J

an idea in the mind.

Locke means the power which a subject has to produce
These

si~ple

ideas of

prL~ary

quality involve

solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest and number; vmereas simple
ideas of secondary qualities are those without which are really nothing
in the objects themselves, but only powers, wb.ich the objects have to
produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities.

In these

Locke includes.colors, sounds, and tastes, which he thinks are produced in

Smith~

24

The Philosophy of David Hume, 104. Smith remarks that "For
the term 'impression,' liume is himself responsible."

25

Locke, Essal•• II,I,24. The following is Locke~ description of all
knowledge: =.:chis then is the original of all knowledge, e.nd the first
capacity of humen intellect - that the mind is fitted to receive the
i~pressions made upon it; either through the senses by outward objects,
or by its o1vn operations when it reflects on them. This is the first
step a man takes toward the discovery of anything, and the groundwork
~~ereon to build all those notions vniich ever we shall have.
And ell
those sublime trcoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high
as heaven itself, take their rise and footing there.
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us by the bulk, figure, texture and motion of the insensible parts of
objects. 26
Thus Locke holds to the doctrine that the mind has only knowledge
of its ovm ideas, 1ghile ·at the sa..."'lle time, i:c order to e.ccount for these
ideas, Locke posits a world of objects beyond consciousness.

How Locke

could hold that the mind has only the knowledge of its ov;n idee.s, end at
the same time maintain that there exist a world of objects beyond our consciousness, is indeed difficult to understand

~nd

presents a real

probl~1.

Eume realized this problem and thus maintained that the external world of
objects is a matter of belief, but not.of knowledge. 27
For Locke, the knowledge of the externe.l world, is derived wholly
from sensation.
sensist.

Therefore his

po~ition

might well be termed that of a

How then does he account for the objects existing by themselves?

26

C. R. I;~rris,. Locke, Berkeley, e.nd Hume.
32 and 33.

Oxford University Press, 1937,

27

Orr, David~~.!:!.!!, Influence ~ Philosophl ~ Theologl• 90.
Concerning the problem £'acing Locke, that the mind has only the knowledge o~ its own ideas, e..nd yet there exists a world of objects beyond
our consciousness, Professor Orr pertinently asks: ~That is the warrant
for this assumption? H~v can an idea which is wholly in the mind,
yield us the knowledge of an object without the mind, or tell us anything of its nature? ••••• If reliance is placed upon the principle of
causation, it is easy to retort, as v.as done by both Berkeley and Hume,
that causation gives no title to infer resemblance, end in the case of
pr:imary any more than of secondary qualities. Hume adds that the whole
procedure is illegit:imate, and going beyond experience.
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This leads directly to hJ.s analysis of substance.
we are aware of

si~ple

V'fhen we perceive,

ideas of primary and secondary qualities.

However,

we cannot imagine that the qualities of which these ideas are ideas, can
subsist in and of themselves.

Therefore we are accustomed to suppose some

substratum which we call substance.
general?

What then is our idea of·substance in

To which Locke replies:
If anyone examines himself concerning his notion of
substance in general, he will find he has no other idea of
it at all, but only a supposition he knows not what, to support such qualities which are capable of producing sLmple
ideas in us •••• The idea, then, to which we give the general
name of substance, being nothing but the supposed but
unknown support of those qualities we find existing which
we Lmagine cannot subsist, without something to support
them; we call that support, substantia, which e..ccording to
the true ~port of the word, is, in plain English,
"standing under," or "upholding." 28

But here another question arises, how do v:e come to have specific
ideas about substance?

Locke answers:

Our specific ideas of substance are nothing but a
collection of a certe.in number of simple ideas, considered
as united in one thing. These ideas of substance, though
they are commonly called 'sLmple apprehension,' and the
names of them 'simple terms,' are conplex and compounded. 29
Locke continues by way of example.

The idea that an Englis!unan has of

the name swan signifies white, color, neck, long, red beak and black legs,
of a certain size with the power to swLm in the water, all of them united
in one common object, swan.

28

Locke, II,XXIII,2.

29

~·•

II,XXIII, 14.

Therefore Locke concludes that substance is

r
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really unknown to us.

Later Hume holds the same position, for he raises

the question, "whether the idea of substance is derived from the impressions
of sensation or reflection?" 30

If, according to the senses, b~.r which one?

But since this is not possible, Rume continues his argument, the idea of
substance must come from some impression of reflection.

But as all such

impressions are either in the passions or emotions, neither of which are
adequate to represent a substance, we must conclude, that we have no idea
of substance distinct from that of a collection of partioular qualities.31
One other importent influence of Locke upon H'l.lJ:le is found in his
treatment of knowledge.

For to Locke, knowledge is nothing but

The perception of the connection and agreement, or
disagreement and repugnancy of any of our 1deas. In
this alone it consists. Where t!cis perception is, there
is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may
fancy, gues~ or believe, yet we always come short of
knowledge. 3
Hume likewise maintains that knowledge is only in the comparison of
ideas, for he admits that he defines knowledge as those philosophers who
consider it, "to be that evidence which arises from the comparison of ideas,'
and in the same paragraph he further emphasizes his positioh in the followin
description, that, "by knowledge, I mean the assurance arising from the

30

Hume, Treatise, I,I,6.

31

Ibid.

32

Locke, IV,I,2.

58

comparison of idea.s."33
Locke further describes the different degrees of knowledge, and the
distinction is clearly seen, in "the different clearness of our knowledge,
which seems to me to lie in the different way of perception the mind has of
the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas." 34
The description of the three different degrees of knowledge, continues.
There is, first of all, intuitive knowledge in
agreement or

disagre~ent

intervention of any other.
circle is not a triangle.

~ich

the mind perceives the

of two ideas, Urnnedia.tely, that is
For

exa~ple,

wit~out

the

that white is not blaok, and that a.

This intuitive knowledge Locke describes as

Irresistible, and like bright sunshine, forces itself
immediately to be perceived a.s soon a.s ever the mind turns
its view that we.~; and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt,
or examination.35
All certainty depends upon this intuitive knowledge, and it is so
great, that no one can conceive himself capable of a greater certainty than
the knowledge that any idea in his mind is such as he perceives it to be,
and no other.

To this Locke adds another sentence that leads

rig~t

center of Hume' s scepticism, for he says,
He that demands greater certainty than this, demands
he knows not what, and shows only that he has a mind to be
a. sceptic, without being able to do so.36

33

Hume, Treatise, I,III,ll.

34

Locke, IV,II,l.

35

Ibid.

36

Ibid.

into the
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Hence once more- Hume agrees with Locke that the only knowl$dge that
involves certainty is intuitive knowledge- which includes those relations
Depending solely upon ideas, which can be the objects
of knowledge and certainty. These four are resemblancecontrariety_ degrees in qulity, and proportions in quantity
and number. Three of these relations are discoverable at
first sight, and fall more pronerly under the province of
i~tuition than demonstration.37
These three discoverable at first sight include resemblance, contrariety- e.nd degrees of any quality.

In the fourth relationship Hume

distinguishes between Arithmetic and Algebra, in contrast to Geometry, where
appearances are involved.

The other three relations are not intuitive_

therefore they do not give certainty_ neither are they objects of kn~ledge~ 8
The second degree of knowledge, according to Locke, involves demonstrative knowledge where the mind proceeds to discover agreement or disagreement
of two ideas by the intervention of other ideas.

However- each step in this

demonstration must have intuitive evidence, since without such perception
no knowledge can arise.
certainty.

Mathematics is capable of this demonstrative

Hume also agrees with this position. 39

HOwever, it is in the third degree of knowledge that Locke's strongest
influence upon Hume is clearly seen.

For this third degree, which is

sensitive knowledge, only goes under the name of knowledge, but does not
reach the certainty of the first two degrees of knowledge.

37

Hume, Treatise, I,III,l.

38

Ibid.

39

Locke, IV, II,2.

It consists in
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"the perception of the mind concerning the particular existence of finite
beings without it."40

Locke further states that, as to whether there be

anything more than the ideas in our minds, that of external existing bodies,
corresponding to our ideas, some men doubt.

But concerning the existence

of bodies in general he holds that doubt is unreasonable, because of the
clear difference between the idea of sense, and an idea of memory or llnagination.41
Hume likewise holds that there is a difference between perception and
the memory or imagination, and that difference is one of feeling, but that
does not necessarily prove the independent existence of a physical world. 42
Moreover, Hume also holds that the existence of the external world, also
must be .taken for granted; for
We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in
the existence of body? but it is vain to ask, Whether there
be body or not? That is a point which we must take for
granted in all our reasonings.43
Thus the relationship and influence of Locke upon Hume is evident in
Locke's statement that all knowledge comes out of experience and observation;
that all that is included in knowledge involves sensation and reflection,

40

~·•

41

Ibid.

42

JIIJ.Orris, Locke, Berkeley, and

43

Hume, Treatise, I,IV,2.

IV,II,14.

~··

46.
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and

tha~

the mind has only the knowledge of its own ideas.

Furthermore 1 to

Locke, as to Hume, the real nature of substance is unknown 1 and Locke finds
himself in equal difficulty in dealing with the self.

Furthermore his

statement that mathematics is capable of certainty, as well as his distinction between perception and the imagination, indicate his relationship to
Hume.
That Hume was greatly influenced by Locke is also expressed by that
Humian authority, Hendel, in the following summary:
The writings of John Locke were i;mnensely important
for Hume ••••• Their influence upon European thought had
come to be very great, pervading the literature of the
ti~e. It was authoritative for Hume as well as others.44
From Locke it is but a step to the consideration of Berkeley's influence
upon Hume.

The opening statement of Berkeley's Principles of Human

not only expresses his own view as to our knowledge of the external

Knowledg~
world~

but also clearly presents evidence for his first influence upon Hume.
It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the
·objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas
actually imprinted upon the senses; or else such as are
perceived by attending to the passions and operations of
the mind; or, lastly, ideas formed by the help of memory
and i~agination - either compounding, dividing, or barely
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid
ways.45
In these three divisions of the objects of knowledge are found all of
Hume's perceptions.

The first two, sense-ideas, and the ideas of the pas-

sions and operations of the mind 1 include Hume's impressions, whereas the

44
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KnowlAdP"A T .. i
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third division, representations, correspond to Hume's ideas, and nearly
correspond to Locke's simple ideas of sense and reflection, and his complex
ideas. 46
After his opening analysis of the objects of knowledge, Berkeley
continues with a description of what it is that knows.
There is likewise something which knows or perceives
them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, remembering
about them. This perceiving, acting being, is what I call
Mind, Spirit, Soul, or MYself. By which words I do not
denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct
from them, wherein they exist, or which is the same thing,
whereby they are perceived - for the existence of an idea
consists in its being perceived.47
This, however, Fraser warns us, must not be taken to mean that Berkeley
affirms the Ego, any more than the world of ideas is existing absolutely
independent of being conscious, but rather that this

'somet~ing,'

is the

Ego, or conscious subject, which the object world infers, and through which
it is united and becomes intelligible. 48
Hume carries this statement of Berkeley just one step further.

He

asserts that instead of the existence of an idea consisting in being
perceived, he holds that not only ideas but also impressions are perceived,
and these L~pressions are all that is perceived.49
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From this point, Berkeley, in following Locke, has little difficulty
in disposing of material substance.

He begins by showing, as Locke before

him had already shown, that the bmnediate objects of all knowledge are ideas.
From this he logically concludes that the assumption of a second world of
external sense-objects is without justification.

This is made clear, if we

understand what is meant by the term, exist, When used in reference to
sensible things.

This point he demonstrates by way of illustration.

The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and
feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it
existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might
perceive it, or that some other Spirit actually does perceive
it. There was an odor, that is, it was runelt; there was a
sound, that is, it was heard, a color, or a figure and it
was perceived by sight or touch ••• For as to what is said
of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any
relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly
unintelligible. Their Esse is Percipi, nor is it possible
they should have any existence out of the minds of thinking
things which perceive them.50
Later Hume asserts that the essence of the mind are perceptions.

That

there is an actual existing world, Berkeley continues, is
An opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that
houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible
objects, have an existence, real, or natural, distinct
from their being perceived by the understanding.51

Here Berkeley holds that the existence of an external world is a matter
of opinion and further in the s~e section, (Section 4) he calls it
assurance.

50 Berkeley, I,3.
51
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Hume also states that all men hold to the belief or opinion of an
external world.52
Our of this assertion of the existence of the external world being
merely a matter of opinion, Berkeley continues by stating that such a view,
that is the attempted distinction of sensible objects from their being
perceived, is found at the root to depend upon the doctrine of abstract ideas
Berkeley summarizes his visw in the following way:
In a word the things we see and feel - what are they
but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or impressions on
the sense, and is it possible to separate even in thought,
any of these from perceptions?53

If it is possible to separate by fmagination the trunk of a body without
limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself,
then there is abstraction.
In demonstration of the part of the imagination in the consciousness of
the existence of the external world, Hume uses almost the identical illustration.
Suppose I see the legs and thighs of a person in
motion, While some interposed object conceals the rest
of the body. Here, it is certain, the imagination spread
out the whole figure. I give him a head and shoulders,
and breast and neck. These members I conceive and believe
him to be possessed of. Nothing can be more evident than
that this whole operation is performed by the thought or
imagination alone.54
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Berkeley concludes this section with the statement that to him, in
truth the object and sensation are the thing, and therefore he claims that
they cannot be abstracted from one another.
InHume's treatment of abstract ideas, Berkeley's most direct and
significant inflaence is evident.

This is evident in that Hume not only

recognizes his influence, but considers Berkeley's treatment as "one of the
greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years."
Hume's own account reveals his indebtedness to Berkeley.
A great philosopher, (Dr. Berkeley in footnote) has
the received opinion in this particular, and has
asserted, that all general ideas are nothing but particular
ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more
extensive signification, and makes them recall upon
occasion other individuals, which are similar to them ••••
I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable
discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters.55
disput~d

Berkeley's treatment of the external world as known by the imagination,
also indicates his influence upon Hume.

If substances exist without the

mind, asks Berkeley, how could we possibly know them?

It would be neither

by reason, nor by the senses, both of which are insufficient.

But someone

may ask, is it not easy to imagine trees in a park or books in a closet?
To this he replies, surely that is possible, but is only shows you have the
power of imagination of the formation of ideas in your mind. 56
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T~is

is the same position of Hume, in fact he proceeds in his develop-

ment along the same order.

Neither the senses, nor the reason is sufficient

to induce us to believe in the external world, therefore, he concludes we
hold to an external world by means of the imagination.57
There remains one negative influence of Berkeley upon Hume, to which
he sees fit to give considerable emphasis.

For in the final analysis Hume

feels that Berkeley's arguments result in Scepticism, rather than in proof.
Most of the writings of that ingenius author, (Berkeley)
form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found
either among the ancients or modern philosophers ••••• All his
arguments, though othenvise intended, are in reality, merely
sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer
and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause
that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion,
which is the result of scepticis.m.58
Thus the influence of Berkeley and his relationship have been clearly
shown, though not as widespread as was that of John Locke.

Berkeley's

emphasis upon the essence of the mind as perception, and that the existence
of the external bodies is merely a matter of opinion or assurance, and
arises neither from the senses, nor reason, but by the imagination, are
directly evident in Hume's system.

Also his doctrine of abstract ideas was

acknowledged by Hume to be of vital importance.
However, Locke is connected with Hume's thought in more aspects than
Berkeley.

Like Locke, Hume held that all knowledge comes out of experience

and observation, and that all knowledge includes sensation and reflection.
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Likewise Hume held as did Locke that the mind has knowledge only of its own
ideas, and that the nature of substance was unknown.
Although Hume accepted the general principles of both Locke and

Berkele~

he felt impelled for the sake of his science of man to give a definite
anffWer to the question about the external world.

To find this answer he had

not only to accept the principles of these two forerunners, but at the
time to push further the analysis of sense knowledge.

s~~e

CHAPTER IV

AN EVALUATION OF HUME'S POSITION
In order to evaluate properly the philosophy of David Hume, or any
other philosopher, it is necessary, first of all, to consider his first
principle, for, "what is first, last, and always in human knowledge is its
first principle."l
The first principle of Hume's philosophy is that "no beings are ever
present to the mind but perceptions."2

Therefore all that ever appears to

the mind are these perceptions, for it is "the successive perceptions that
constitute the mind."3

And if we are to have any certainty it is that of

these perceptions, since "the only existence of which we are certain are
perceptions." 4
tions~

Thus the mind, according to Hume, consists of these percep-

and
Whe.t 'V're call a mind is nothing but a heap or
collection of different perc~ptions, united together
by certain relations, and supposed though falsely, to
be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.s

1

Gilson, 313.

2
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Of these perceptions of the human mind there are two kinds, which Hume
describes in the opening sentence of the Treatise.
All the perceptions of the human mind resolve
themselves into·two distinct kinds, which I call impressions
and ideas.s
He gives priority and precedence to the impressions; in fact he asserts
that this
Is the first principle I establish in the science
of human nature; nor ought we to despise it because of
the simplicity of its appearance ••• the present question
concerning the precedency of our impressions.7
Thus having stated that all the existences ere perceptions, of which
alon.e we are certain, and that these perceptions are the contents of the
mind, Hume is given over to what Gilson has rightly described as
The most tempting of all false, first principles
•••• that thought, not being, is involved in all my
representations. Here lies the initial option between
idealism and realism, which will settle once and for
all the future course of philosophy, and make it a
success or failure.8

In this false first principle of thought, Hume has chosen the pathway
of idealism and subjectivism.

However, his principle of

~~anence,

that

"no beings are ever present to the mind but perceptions," need not be
accepted.

For on the basis of this principle knowledge is measured by

knowledge, which leads all along the way to uncertainty and ends ultimately
and inevitably in scepticism.

I,I,l.

6

~.,

7

Ibid.

8

Gilson, 316.

70

Since Hume has chosen thought as his first

principle~

we notice the

inadequacy of his first principle of reality, which is his own mind, only
perceptions, and as that alone exists, he is faced with the problem of the
external world, which is merely a supposition or belief.
Likewise the inadequacy of his first principle of knowledge, by which
we judge knowledge by knowledge, or as Hume terms it, by the comparison of
ideas.

His knowledge is thus reduced to probability.

Had Hume begun with

the first principle of being, which can know other beings, existent things,
there would be no problem of the existence of the external world, for being
invo 1ves the knowledge of other beings, the knowledge of things.
The inadequacy of his first principle is further evidenced in his own
treatment of sense knowledge.

Here once more he is driven to scepticism.

He himself admits we must confine ourselves to appearances only, if we are
to carry
Our inquiry beyond appearance of objects to the
sens.es, I am afraid that most of our conclusions will
be full of scepticism and uncertainty.9
Why this conclusion?

If perceptions alone exist, and they resolve

themselves into impressions and ideas, all of which are passions,, emotions
and sensations, again, there remains no way to mea.sure knowledge but, by
itself.

Senses are known only by senses.

Therefore Hume is forced to

confess that though he had begun with
lmplicit faith in our senses •••• I feel myself at
present of a quite contrary sentim.ent and am inclined to
repose no faith at all in my senses.l0

9 Hume, Treatise, I,II,5.
10 Ibid., I,IV,2.
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Hume's difficulty with the senses is due to his inability to deal with
self or personal identity.

Since thought, not being, is his first principle,

he has ruled out metaphysics, by which alone he could realize self.
does admit the inadequacy of sense to determine this question.

He

He even goes

so far as to admit that at this point, we must have recourse to the most
profound metaphysics to give a satisfactory an5Wer to it~ 11

However, he

tmmediately adds, that in common life these ideas of "self, and person are
never very fixed nor determinate.nl2
Still it is evident that Hume realized the vital importance of this
question of self or personal identity, and that it is closely related to
the issue of the external world,_ for shortly after the statement just quoted,
he returns again to the question, and this time in relationship to the
external world.
To begin with the question concerning external
existences, it may perhaps be said, that setting aside
the metaphysical question of the identity of a thinking
substance, our own body evidently belongs to us.l3
Here again the whole difficulty is due to his first principle of
thought, for Hume now finds himself enmeshed within the net of his own
perceptions.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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For my part, when I enter most intimately into
what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular
perception, or other, or heat or cold, light or shade
•••• I never catch myself at any time without a perception,
and can never observe anything but the perception.l4
So he concludes, when he is asleep and insensible regarding himself,
he is truly to be considered not to exist.

And if all

hi~

perceptions

v;ere removed by death, he would be annihilated, and then what would be
required to consider himself "a perfect nonentity." 15

Here it is evident

Hume would do away with the immortality of the soul.
Again we see the insufficiency of his first principle, for since all
the perceptions are impressions and ideas, Hume asks the question concerning
the

~ateriality

of the soul, what is

The impression that produces it, and tell
distinctly after what manner that im~ression operates,
and from what object it is derived?l
Therefore Hume dismisses the issue and feels it sufficient reason to
abandon the discussion of the materiality and immateriality of the soul.
Thus, having seen the inadequacy of Hume's first principle in relation
to sense knowledge, our self, or personal identity and the innnortality of
the soul, we now consider his first principle as it applies to reason.
Beginning with thought, which consists only in perceptions, in turn resolving themselves in impressions, the faculty of reason becomes to Hume a
matter of custom and thus has no grounds of evidence for judgment and

14
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demonstration.

In other words that by which we alone judge anything as

being intelligible, becomes to Hume unintelligible, since reason as every
other faculty is one of perception.
Therefore his conclusion concerning reason, that it is inadequate, in
that it cannot give any degree of evidence concerning any proposition, a.nd
further, that it ends in total suspense of judgment.
reason, Hume is on another road to scepticism.

Having thus ruled out

In attempting to answer

those who reject all arguments of sceptics without inquiry, or examination
Hume replies
If the sceptical reasonings be strong, say they, it
is proof that reason may have some force and authority;
if weak, they can never.be sufficient to invalidate all
the conclusions of our understanding. Thus argument is
not just •••• for reason first appears in possession of
the throne, prescr.ibing laws, and imposing maxims, with
an absolute sway and authority. Her enemy, therefore,
is obliged to take shelter under her protection, end by
making use of rational arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbecility of reason and produces in a manner
patent under her own hand and seal. This patent he.s at
first an authority proportioned to the immediate authority of reason, from which it is derived. But as it is
supposed to be contradictory to reason, it gradually
diminishes the force of that governing power, and its
own at the same time; till at last both vanish away into
nothing, by a regular and just diminution.l7
This lengthy description shows Hume's uncertainty and a kind of
confusion concerning reason.

However, he concludes the analysis by stating

that it is fortunate that nature breaks the force of such sceptical arguments in time, and thus keeps them from influencing our understanding.

17
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He further holds that the understanding acting alone, and according
to its most general principle, "subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest
degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or in common
life.nl8
This leads to Hume's final significant question in which the end of
reason is clearly seen.
consequences?

He asks, if reason itself be refused, what are the

His own words present the best answer and indicate the

sceptical results as well as the logical dilemma in which he now finds himself.

He asks the question,
Shall we then, establish it for a general maxim,
that no refined or elaborate reasoning is ever to be
received. Consider well the consequences of such a
principle. By this means you cut off entirely all science
and philosophy.l9
Furthermore, Hume continues, you contradict yourself, since,
You proceed upon one singular quality of the
:imagination, and by a parity of reason you embrace all
of them; and you expressly contradict yourself; since
this maxim must be built upon preceding reasoning.20
Finally, he asks what shall be done.

If the issue is between false

reasoning or no reasoning at all, he is at a loss to know what to do.

The

only solution is that this difficulty is soon forgotten, and leaves but a
smell impression.
Thus we have seen the complete inadequacy of Hume's first principle.
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It reduces all knowledge to probability, and destroys the very foundation of
reason and sense knowledge.

If accepted, it ends in the destruction of both

science and philosophy, in the logical dilemma of self contradiction and
ends in scepticimn.

From this consideration of the inadequacy of his first

principle, we turn now to his procedure on the basis of this first principle.
Hume is faced with the problem of the external world.

First, let us

consider his analysis of the imagination, for he concludes that neither the
senses nor reason are sufficient to give any 'notion' (Hume's own expression)
of the existence of the external world.

This has already been shovm is due

to his first principle which invalidates both reason and the senses.

There-

fore there remains only the imagination, a.nd hence he concludes, it "must be
entirely owing to the ima.gina.tion.• 21

The imagination becomes the faculty

by which Hume attempts to solve the problem of the existence of the external
22
world.
He describes the operation of the imagination in the following manner.
Every impression present with the mind, reappears a.s a.n idea. in one of two
ways.

Either as a. lively idea., which he calls memory, or a.s a faint idea.,

it is called imagination.
colors,

~hereas

The memory paints its objects in more distinct

in the imagination the perception is faint a.nd languid, a.nd

cannot be preserved without great difficulty by the mind steady a.nd uniform

21

~·•
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of knowledge."

I, IV, 2.

76
for any considerable time."23

Hume further states that though both ideas

of memory and imagination cannot appear in the mind without previous
impressions, still the imagination is not restrained in the same orde.r as
the

me.m~ry.

Later in another distinction he states that "those faculties

(referring to memory and imagination) are only distinguished by the differen
feeling of the ideas they present."24
If the operation of the imagination be only a reappearance of a former
impression, faint and languid, and hardly able to be preserved by

th~ ~ind

for any length of time steady and uniform, how can it give rise to assurance
of the external world?

Furthermore, if the distinction between memory and

imagination is only distinguished by the difference in the feeling tone of
the ideas, and since they are constantly in a flux, how then .can we be
assured of the external world?
Eut the problem

itself~would

Perhaps we should say there is no answer.

not have arisen, if Hume had not taken the

idealistic position of analysis.
Next, he considers the two principles of the imagination, one permanent,
irresistible and universal, such as the customary transition from causes
to effects, and from effects to causes; then the principles which are weak
and irregular.

The former, he holds, are the foundation of all our thoughts

and actions, so that if they were removed, human nature would immediately
perish and .go to ruin, while the latter are neither unavoidable nor necessa:cy

23
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Concerning the first of the two principles, Hume describes them as
permanent, irresistible and universal.

If the perception in the imagination

be faint and languid, and can only with great difficulty be preserved for
considerable time, on what basis can he describe it as permanent?

Further-

more, if the perceptions of the imagination be such as to lose their original
liveliness as in the. corresponding impression, on what ground does Hume call
it irresistible?

And finally, how can he call this principle universal, when

he has already ruled out any ultimate or universal principles as presumptuous
and chimerical? 25
Regarding the latter principle, weak and irregular, he likens to the
ancient philosophers,

where~s,

the modern philosophy, "pretends to be

entirely free •• and to arise from the solid, permanent and consistent principles in the imagination in·the light of his description?
In the third part of his explanation of the imagination we find the

scope described, and here it is that Hume allows to the imagination free
and almost unbounded scope.
Nothing is more admirable than the readiness with
which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents
them at the very instant in which they become necessary
or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe
to the other, in collecting those ideas which alone belong
to any subject. One would think the whole intellectual
world of ideas was at once subjected to our view, and
that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper
for our purpose. There may not, however, be any present,
besides those very ideas that are thus collected by a kind
of magical faculty of the soul, which though it be always
perfect in the greatest genius, is, however, inexQlicable
by the utmost efforts of the human understanding. 2 6

25

26

~.,

Introduction.

Ibid., I,I,7.

78

Here we have a procedural breakdown.
world is indeed solved.
gible.

The problem of belief in the external

But in solving it we have recourse to the unintelli-

After all why call it inexplicable.

perceptions.

Have they led us astray?

We have placed full emphasis on

Reality pursues the idealist.

every other idealism, flume's is a misplaced reason.

Like

Here he endeavors by

saying it cannot be explained.
However, flume is not without scruples.

He admits his vacillation is

contrary to true philosophy, when referring to the two different senses in
which he uses the word, imagination.
The word imagination is used in two different senses;
and though nothing be more contrary to true philosophy
than this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasonings, I
have often been obliged to fall into it. When I oppose
the imagination to memory, I mean the faculty by which we
form our fainter·ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I
mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative
and probable reasonings.27
Thus we have Hume's own analysis of the imagination, on the basis of
his first principle of immanence.

The

~agination

becomes but a faint idea

of a previous impression, distinguished from memory only in the feeling of
the ideas, and built upon two principles, one permanent, irresistible and
universal, the other weak and irregular.

The imagination can choose its

ideas at random with free and alnost boundless scope, still it is inexplicable to the human understanding.

Furthermore, he admits that the two senses

in which he uses the word imagination is inaccurate and contrary to true
philosophy.

27
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it is opposed to demonstrative and probable reasonings.
Here we are making a two-fold criticism.
accept the immanence principle.

First, no philosophy need

We can rather accept the evidence of things

and validly defend their intelligibility as evidential.

And if one does not

accept this principle, he need not accept Hume's analysis of
the second criticism is procedural.

knowledge~

Hume destroys Rume's bases.

But

We have

just sho\vn how the imagination fails to explain the belief only by denying
it.

But the imagination fails to explain the belief in the external world.

Finally Hume climaxes his whole analysis of the imagination and completely
contradicts his previous explanation, when he places

~amory,

senses and the

understanding all upon the imagination.
He has previously held the imagination to be in opposition to both
memory and ·the Understanding.

Now he asserts that "t!le memory, senses and

understanding are therefore all of them founded upon the
.

•tyo f

v~vac~

L~agination,

or the

.d eas. n28

~

How can he now maintain the

i~agination

founded upon lively ideas, when

he has already expressly distinguished the imagination from memory, by this
very distinction,

na~ely

that the lively ideas of previous impressions were

what he called memory, and the faint ideas he termed the imagination.
In the very next sentence, however, Hume admits not only his inconsistency, but even the fallacy of his own analysis.

Referring to his previous

statement that the memory, senses and imagination are all founded upon the

2s
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imagination, of the vivacity of the ideas, he

a~~its

that it is no wonder

that
A principle so inconstant and fallacious should
lead us into error when i~plicitly followed, as it must,
in all its variations. It is this principle which makes
reason from cause to effect, and ••••which convinces us of
the continued existence of external objects when absent
from the senses.29
Thus we are lead again to scepticism regarding the

L~agination

in

relation to the external world and our belief in it ultimately devours all
knowledge; sense, memory and the understanding.

Here once more Hume's

procedure comes as a result of his first principle.

Since he begins with

thought, he is forced to develop the faculty of the imagination, by which
he asserts we believe in the external world, and now he confesses that this
principle is fallacious and inconstant.
From this analysis of the imagination we now turn to his procedure in
the treatment of the external world.

What happens to the external world?

Here once more he must proceed from his first principle.

If no beings are

ever present alone constitute the mind, then perception is the only knowle
and thus all knowledge is reduced to perception.

We may then have no

to grasp the seemingly extra-mentally existing world.

w~

The problem for Hume

then becomes this - how to explain the assertion of an extra mental world,
as well as the faculty of this assumption.
It should be emphasized first of all, that Hume nowhere denies nor even
attempts to doubt the existence of the external world.

29

Ibid.
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external world involves the question, how does belief or notion of the
external world arise?
the external world.

In several passages he emphasizes the existence of
After the consideration of the scepticism of reason,

he concludes that even though the sceptic continues to believe and reason,
and even though he claims he cannot defend his reason by reason, and by the
same rules
He must assent to the principle concerning the
existence of body, even though he cannot pretend by
any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity.30
Later in the same paragraph, he adds,
We may well ask, What causes induce us to believe
in the existence of body? but it is vain to ask, Whether
there be body or not? That is the point we must take for
granted in all of our reasonings.31
The existence of the external world must be taken for granted in all of
our reasonings.

Why taken for granted?

Had Hume begun with the first

principle of being, the external world would then not have to be taken for
grant~d,

for he would then accept the evidence of things and their intelligi-

bility.

Since it is a very part of the development of being, in that being

knows other beings, or things.
He again emphasizes the external world in the development of the argument.

He has been considering the way in which the mind perceives, and

.

supposes a perception to exist, even when absent from the mind.

30

~.,
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he admits the question is not concerning the external world, but rather the
way in which the mind proceeds to reach a conclusion.

For

The difficulty is not concerning the matter of
fact, whether the mind forms the conclusion concerning
the existence of its perceptions, but only concerning
the manner in which such a conclusion is formed, and
the principles from which it is derived.32
Here two questions arise.

First, how can we hold that

p~rceptions

may be absent from the mind and not be annihilated, and second, how does an
object become present to the mind without creation of a perception or image?
To the first question, Hume simply states his definition of the mind,
which is nothing but a heap or collection of perceptions.
question he maintains the same reasoning continues.

In the second

Here, however, he

admits that external objects are seen, felt and become present to the mind,
that is they acquire such a connection to a collected heap of perceptions.
Here another inadequacy in Hume' s development is evident.

How can we see

objects, when the perceptions by which we are supposed to see them, resolvin
into impressions are all internal and perishing.

Once more Hume's first

principle has bound him within the confines of his own mind.
From here it is but a step for liume to state that we may remove any
seeming interruption between our perceptions and the external world, by
Feigning a continued being •••• but as we here not
only feign, but believe this continued existence, the
question is, from whence arises such a belief?33

32
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Belief arises in the following manner.
in the vivacity of ideas, and these in

tu~n

Since belief merely consists
arise from some present impres-

sions, it is conveyed by a quality of relation, in which memory presents
a vast number of instances of relations.
resemblance, memory and custom.

Therefore, belief involves relatio

However, Hume follows this explanation,

by stating at once the "here we have a propensity to feign the continued
existence of all sensible objects."3 4
Therefore, to Hume, the solution to the problem of the existence of
the external world lies in the belief of such a world.

Here again, the

inadequacy of Hume's view is seen, arising from his first principle of
immanence.
First, his own description of the operation of belief reveals the
weakness of his view.

For

Belief consists merely in a certain feeling or
sentiment; in something that is not dependent upon the
will, but must arise from some determinate causes and
principles of which we are not masters.35

If, therefore, we are not masters, that is, if belief is beyond control,
how then can we have any assurance of its validity, and how can we present
evidence of any certainty?
Second, three times, Hume repeats the use of the word, feign, in
connection with the existence of the external world.

34
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Since the word feign
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means to invent or pretend; if that be the process of the mind in relation
to the external world, we are again left without any certainty, and the end
is once more scepticism.
Third, Hume's own final conclusion to this whole question of belief
follows logically from his first principle, for he admits that
It is impossible for us to distinctly conceive
objects to be in their nature, anything but exactly
the same with the perceptions.36
Then follows his own confession from his whole study of the existence
of the external world, which shows clearly not only the inadequacy of his
procedure, but the first principle of his procedure, the principle of
~anence

which inevitably ends as Hume now acknowledges.

He raises the

question,
What then can we look for from this confusion of
groundless and extraordinary opinions but error and
falsehood? And how can we justify to ourselves any
belief we repose in them.?37
It is interesting to note that he speaks of groundless opinions, which,
of course is inevitable, since he has refused to accept any evidence of
being and things, but only the being of his own perceptions.
What then, is the way out inHume's solution?

His own words give the

answer, and reveal once and for all the consequences, if the principle of
immanence be carried to its logical conclusions.

36
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This sceptical doubt, both'with respect to reason
and the senses, is a malady which can never be cured, but
must return to us every moment, however, we may chase it
away •••• It is impossible under any system to defend either
our understanding or senses; and we expose them further
when we endeavor to justify them in that manner. As the
sceptical doubt arises naturally from a profound and intense
reflection on those subjects, it always increases the
further we car~ our reflections, whether in opposition
or conformity.38
Thus scepticism concerning both reason and the senses is an incurable
malady, and the fUrther we reflect the greater the scepticism, if one begins
with Hume's first principle, which necessarily restricts all knowledge to
knowledge, by means of perceptions, that is sense knowledge, described by
Hume himself as including passions, sensation and emotions.

In his state-

ment that "it is impossible under any system to defend either our understanding or senses," he should have included and added, under any system
that begins with the first principle of immanence.

For had he begun with

the first principle of being which knows other beings, he would soon have
seen that the intellect is not then in contradiction to the senses, but
the intellect is in touch with the sense world, and from that first principle, others follow, one of which is that of sufficient reason, that to every
being there must be an adequate reason, for i f reality be intelligible,
there' must be a reason for things.
What then does Hume consider the remedy?

There is no way out, for the

only remedy is "carelessness and inattention." 39
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For, whatever the reader's
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view may be at the moment, an hour later he will still be persuaded that
there is both an internal as well as external world. 40
Why this persuasion, for which Hume cannot account?

And we answer

without reluctance that it is in the very nature of being, by which the
intellect knows the reality of the external world.
From this total scepticism of Hume concerning reason and the senses,
and concerning the problem of the existence of the external world, including
both the imagination, and belief in the existence of the world, other
scepticism also follows.
~~at

of the problem of universals, for universala "are but another

n~~e

for what we call concepts or general ideas," and "these ideas or concepts
are the very stuff of which our knowledge is made." 41
The problem, for Hume, is that concerning abstract or general ideas,
"whether they be general or particular in the mind's conception of them."42
Here he refers to a great philosopher, (Dr. Berkeley mentioned in the footnote) who disputed the generally held view and Berkeley has concluded, "that
all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term,
which gives them a more extensive signifioation."43
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be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of
late years in the republic of letters."44

Therefore he desires to confirm

with some arguments which he feels will put it beyond all doubt and controversy.
Hume holds that everything is particular in nature. which he states is
a principle generally received in philosophy.

However, when he comes to the

application, in showing the procedure of abstraction. the difficulty arises.
For the application of ideas, beyond their nature proceeds
From our collecting all their possible degrees of
quantity and quality, in such an hnperfect manner as m~y
serve the purpose of life.45
If we find a resemblance gmong several objects that occur to us, we
apply the same

na~e

to all of tham, regardless of the differences in quality

or quantity we may observe.46

Summarizing this whole process, Hume con-

eludes,
This then. is the nature of our abstract ideas and
general terms •••• that some ideas are particular in their
representation. A particular idea becomes general, by
being annexed to a general term.47
But someone may inquire, how does this process take place.

To which

Hume answers, it is the work of the imagination. which suggests with
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readiness its ideas# "the fancy runs from one end of the universe to the
other in collecting those ideas which belong to any subject." 48
First, it is evident that though Hume does describe the process of the
imagination by which the universals are considered, he says nothing of the
nature of the universals themselves, that is what are universals?

This may

be due to the fact that he already in the Introduction to the Treatise ruled
out universals and ultimate principles,

~~ich

from his first principle of

thought, must be the case.
Second, the explanation c0ncerning abstract ideas presents a difficulty
well described by Smith.
Hume is faced by the same difficulty which also
faced Berkeley, end to which neither of them had a
consistent answer ••• howwe can think of 'all', or 'every,'
or 'any; or how we can think of a 'sort,' or 'kind,' or
of a common characteristic, if we have no other means
of doing so than of taking a particular idea a representative of others resembling it.49
Third, and most important, if there be no universals, what becomes of
knowledge?

Hume must answer, since he has chosen the first principle of

thought, that all knovrledge is reduced to probability, for since the mind
knows only its only perceptions, and these are within man, knowledge becomes
merely a matter of probability.
What happens to causation in Hume's system?

He defines a cause as

An object precedent and contiguous to another, and
so united with it, that the idea of the one determines
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the mind to form an idea of the other, and the impression
of the one to form a more lively idea of the other.SO
Although the probabilities of causes are of various kinds, they are
all derived from the same origin, namely, "the association of ideas to a
present impression."

Hence the relation of causes to effects is the work

of the imagination, for "each impression draws along with it a precise idea,
which takes its place in the imagination, as something solid and real,
certain and invariable." 51
But we have already seen that from Hume's own analysis, beginning with
his first principle, the imagination leads to scepticism, how then can it
present ideas as real, certain and invariable?
Hume also considers the question of efficacy of power in causation.
He feels it has been the basis of much dispute among philosophers both
ancient and modern.

However, he acknowledges that he has rec'eived little

encouragement from these philosophers, "who pretended to explain the secret
force and energy of causes."52
He dismisses the whole discussion, however, with the restatement of his
former principle.
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We have established it as a principle that as all
ideas are derived from impressions, or some precedent perceptions, it is impossible we can have any idea of power or
efficacy, unless some instances can be produced, wherein this
power is perceived to exert itselr.53
Finally, he considers it frivolous of those who say that effect must
have a cause, since it is implied in the very meaning of effect.

Still, thi

does not prove that every being must be preceded by a cause, any more than
one would reason because

eve~J

that every man must be married.

husband has a wife, that therefore it follows
The real issue, he feels, is this, whether

every object that begins to exist, must owe its existence to a cause, and
to this he answers most emphatically," and this I assert to be neither
intuitively nor demonstratively certain."54
Here again Hume is caught in the net of his first principle of
Lmmanence.

For had he begun with the first principle of being, that very

first principle involves existence, and that existence is due either to
itself or some other cause.
In Hume's further analysis of substance and the soul, his first
principle again confines his conclusion.

For in the light of his first

principle, only perceptions are existing in the mind, which resolve into
impressions and ideas, and thus substance is ruled out.

There are only

two kinds of impressions, those of sensation and those of reflection.
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idea of substance could not possibly come from some impression of sensation.
for by which of the senses could it be perceived?

Then it must come from

reflection, but all the impressions resolve into our passions and emotions.
none of which could possibly represent a substance.

Therefore we have no

idea of substance, for that idea is nothing but a collection of simple
ideas united by my

imagination~

Thus he concludes that

These principles of substantial forms, and accidents,
are not in reality any of the known properties of §gdies,
but are perfectly unintelligible and inexplicable.
From Hume's own first principle, substance and accidents must be
unintelligible and inexplicable, since he has no principle of intelligibility, since he has already ruled out reason as insufficient, and but
instinctive and unintelligible.
Thus, he likewise concludes, on the same basis of his first principle
that the question concerning the substance of the soul is utterly unintelligible.

56

Concerning his scepticism of self or personal identity, we have already
taken note, however, it is indeed interesting to mention here the criticism
of those who would be inclined to agree with most of Hume's position.
Smith observes that Hume is inconsistent in his analysis of self, for
several times in dealing with the passions he speaks of the self as if it
were actual, and not just a bundle of perceptions.
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It is evident that the idea or rather impression
ourselves is always intLmately present with us, and
that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception
of our own person.57

or

Again Hume states that
The immediate object of pride and himility is
self, or that identical person of whose thoughts,
actions, and sensations, we are intemately conscious.58
In this second passage Hume definitely

use~

the term self or person,

though, he by the sheer force of his own first principle, has been forced
to rule it out.
Price also pertinently remarks that when Hume speaks of the operation
of the imagination, as making a smooth transition, that
It the imagination is to make this smooth transition
from item to item, must not it, itself gave an identity
which is not fictitious or constructed? 9
That Hume realized, e_t least to some degree, his own deficiency in this
respect is obvious from his confession in the Appendix.

He had entertained

some hope that even though his theory of the intellectual world might be
deficient, it would at least free him frdm these absurdities and contradictions
;vorld.

~~ich

accompany every explanation of reason concerning the material

But now he finds himself in a labyrinth, after dealing with his

section on personal identity, he knows not how to correct his former
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opinions, nor how to render them consistent. 60
He finally admits his dilemma, which he is unable to render consistent
or to renounce two principles that unite our successive perceptions in our
thought or consciousness.
That all our distinct perceptions are distinct
existences, and that the mind never perceives any real
connection among distinct existences. 61
We have seen clearly that Hume's first principle of immanence, that
no beings are ever present to the mind but its perceptions, has led to his
inadequate analysis of both reason and senses, the imagination and the
external world, and that accepting his first principle, we not only end in
uncertainty, but scepticism.

In the last above quoted confession of Hume

at the very end of his lrl1ole study, he admits that he actually has found no
solution to the problem of the external world.
As has been indicated continually, it is not necessary to accept Hume's
first principle of immanence, that thought is the first principle.

Had Hume

begun with the.first principle of being, he would have had an adequate
solution to the problem of the existent world, and at the same time the
removal of scepticism.
Beginning therefore, with the principle of being, we have the basis
for knowledge and for metaphysics.

First of all, if we begin with being,

the notion of being, certain first principles follow.

60
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First, I compare being with

it~elf

and find that it is identical, and

thus state as the principle of identity, whatever is, is; or, if a being is,
it is.

This, we find was one of Hume's co'nstant difficulties in considera-

tion of self and personal identity.
Second, I come to the second principle, that if being is, I compare
it with that which is not, I derive another principle,_that a thing cannot
be and not be at the smne time.

This is the principle of contradiction.

It has been evident, that Hume's numerous statements of contradiction are
due to his first principle of thought.

Had he begun with being, this

second principle would have become evident to him.
Thus being is the first principle from which all other ,knowledge may
be derived progressively.

And the human intellect in touch with the

sensible world intuits the first principles.

It should be emphasized,

however, that
Reason has not to prove any one of these first
principles, otherv1ise they would not be first principles but conclusions; but it is by them that reason
proves all the rest •••• The first principle brings with
it, therefore, both the certitude that metaphysics is
the science of being as being, and the ab~tract laws
according to which that science has to be constructed. 62
It is because of this lack of understanding on the part of Hume of the
first principle that he uses the word with confused meaning, as a supposition or idea.
Here also is the reason for the inadequacy of any certitude in Hume.
He refers in numerous passages to metaphysical reasonings, particularly_
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when considering the question of personal identity, but on the basis of
his first principle he has ruled out all metaphysics, which alone can give
intellectual certainty.
He also rules out reason on the basis of his starting point, and
though he accepts sense knowledge, he has no way to validate that knowledge
but by itself.

Hence his sceptical conclusions.

Thus had Hume begun with the first principle of.being, a position of
realism, rather than his idealism, subjective and empirical only, he would
have been able to adequately solve the problem of the external world, and
the problem which he admits in the very end of his work, remains insoluble,
as it must, in the nature of the case, would have been completely solved.
Therefore it is evident that the reason Hume's philosophy leads all
along the way to doubt and uncertainty and ends in sceptical philosophy is
due to his first principle.

Instead of making thought a part of being, he

enclosed a 11 being in thought, making mind, to be nothing but a heap or
collection of perceptions.

Thus his subjective idealism, his empirical

attack throughout his whole system with no ultimate point of reference outside of that mind which is always

perceivir~

itself.

Thus, what Gilson eo

expresses of any philosopher, is particularly realized in David Hume, in
that he did "include the whole in one of its parts." 63
For Hume the part was knowledge, in fact, sense knowledge.
part he gave us a rich and stirhulatin,g analysis.

63
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Of that

But, unfortunately for
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h~

and for the many subject to his influence. to that part he sacrificed

the whole.

Thus having.locked himself within a part of reality. he was

never able to get out and never able to regain the whole.

THE END
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